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APPLYING THE ADA TO MITIGATING
MEASURES CASES: A Choice of Statutory Evils
Lisa Eichhorn*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite media portrayals to the contrary,' courts have significantly
restricted the scope of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA")
2
since its passage. A recent study has found that courts dismiss numerous
disability discrimination cases under the ADA,3 often holding that plaintiffs
lack the disabled status that would give them standing to bring suit.4 In order
to prove disabled status, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she suffers from an
impairment that "substantially limits" her in certain activities.5 This showing
is particularly difficult for plaintiffs who employ measures such as
medication, hearing aids, or other corrective devices to mitigate the effects
of their impairments. Although these plaintiffs have real mental and physical
impairments that can generate truly invidious discrimination, their mitigating
measures tend to make their disabilities less visible and their suffering less
acute. As a result, when such individuals attempt to invoke federal statutory
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of Law. J.D., Duke
University School of Law, 1990. I wish to thank the reference librarians of the University of
Denver Westminster Law Library for their help and tolerance as I researched, wrote, and edited
this entire Article in their midst while waiting for office space to become available.
1. See, e.g., Ruth Shalit, Defining Disability Down: Why Johnny Can't Read, Write, or Sit
Still, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997, at 16, 17 (criticizing the coverage of learning disabilities
under the ADA and claiming that the "civil rights law has expanded to cover not merely the halt,
the lame and the blind, but the dysfunctional, the debilitated and the drowsy"); James Bovard, The
Disabilities Act's Parade of Absurdities, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1995, at A16 (erroneously implying
that cocaine addiction is a covered disability under the ADA).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
3. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants,
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 109 (1999) (noting that defendant-employers prevailed in 570 out
of 615 ADA cases at the trial court level between 1992 and 1998, and that 238 of these 570 cases
were resolved through summary judgment).
4. See id. at 103 n.24 (noting that many of the summary judgment decisions favoring
defendants in ADA cases involve the issue of whether the plaintiff is an individual with a
disability).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) (defining "disability" as (1) "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits" a major life activity, (2) "a record of such an impairment," or
(3) the state of "being regarded as having such an impairment").
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protection from disability discrimination, their efforts generate backlash in
the popular media6 and, frequently, summary dismissals in the courts.7 The
media and the courts, it seems, are saving their sympathy for those who
experience some requisite amount of obvious suffering and thus earn a place
among a mythical class of "truly disabled" individuals.8
The idea of restricting the ADA's coverage to such a narrow class,
however, contradicts both the congressional intent behind the statute and the
broader philosophical premises on which disability policy should be based.
Although the statute's convoluted language does a far from perfect job of
translating Congress's intentions, 9 the legislative history shows that the ADA
was never meant to allow discrimination against people with epilepsy,
diabetes, severe hearing loss, and other impairments that can be alleviated
with the help of modern medicine.'" In addition, as a philosophical matter,
the eradication of disability-based discrimination requires the law to define
disability broadly, so as to include these people and others whom society has
traditionally viewed as outside the normal range of human experience."
Nevertheless, to avoid the evil of allowing those who are not "truly
disabled" through the courthouse door, many courts have opted for the
greater evil of restricting the ADA's disability definition by taking account of
mitigating measures when assessing whether a plaintiffs impairment
"substantially limits" her.
6. See, e.g., Walter Olson, Under the ADA We May All Be Disabled, WALL ST. J., May
17, 1999, at A27 (criticizing the coverage of "mitigated" impairments under the ADA, and
remarking that "[s]oon we may achieve a Lake-Wobegon effect in reverse, in which we will all get
to be below average").
7. See, e.g., Cline v. Fort Howard Corp., 963 F. Supp. 1075, 1080-81 n.6 (E.D. Okla.
1997) (granting summary judgment on an ADA claim because the plaintiff, who employed
mitigating measures, was not "disabled"); Gaddy ex rel. Gaddy v. Four B Corp., 953 F. Supp.
331, 337 (D. Kan. 1997) (same); Schluter v. Indus. Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (W.D.
Wis. 1996) (same).
8. See, e.g., Halperin v. Abacus Tech. Corp., 128 F.3d 191, 200 (4th Cir. 1997) ("The
ADA simply was not designed to protect the public from all adverse effects of ill-health and
misfortune. Rather, the ADA was designed to 'assure[ ] that truly disabled, but genuinely capable,
individuals will not face discrimination in employment .... '") (quoting Forrisi v. Bowen,
794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986)).
9. See Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The
Failure of the "Disability" Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L.
REv. 1405, 1428-33 (1999) (noting that individual elements of the ADA's "disability" definition do
not always reflect the intent of the drafters).
10. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
334 (specifically noting that people who use devices or medications to alleviate hearing loss,
diabetes, and epilepsy are "disabled" for purposes of the ADA).
11. For a discussion of the philosophies underlying the disability rights movement, see infra
notes 29-46 and accompanying text.
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The United States Supreme Court has now put its imprimatur on this
approach, deciding in a trio of cases that the effects of mitigating measures
can prevent a plaintiff from being substantially limited and, thus, from
having the disabled status necessary to invoke the protections of the ADA. 2
Confronted with the rather unworkable language of the disability definition,
the Court had to decide in these cases whether to cover some individuals
whom Congress may have meant to exclude from coverage, or to exclude
some individuals whom Congress surely intended to cover.' 3 In light of the
philosophy underlying the ADA in the first place, and in light of the societal
need for broad-based action to eliminate disability discrimination, the Court's
holdings represent the far greater of the two evils.
This Article critiques the idea that the ADA should exclude from its
coverage people who use mitigating measures to alleviate the effects of their
mental and physical impairments. Part II discusses the societal and political
conditions that lead to the condemnation of various types of discrimination
and explains how these conditions necessitate broad-ranging action to combat
disability discrimination. Part III describes the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 generally as an expansive but flawed legislative tool designed to
fight this type of discrimination. Next, Part IV analyzes the ADA's
provisions in the specific context of disability discrimination cases brought
by plaintiffs who use medications, corrective devices, and other so-called
mitigating measures to alleviate the effects of their mental and physical
impairments. Part V then describes how the United States Supreme Court
interpreted these provisions in three recent cases, each of which involved
plaintiffs who employed mitigating measures. Part VI critiques the Supreme
Court's reasoning, arguing that its narrow interpretation of the ADA's
"disability" definition in the mitigating measures context represents the
greater of the two evils with which the statutory language presented the
Court. Finally, Part VII concludes this Article by calling for legislative
action to reestablish the appropriately broad reach of the ADA and to prevent
the Court's recent decisions from perpetuating the greater evil of unchecked
discrimination against disabled persons who control the effects of their
impairments through mitigating measures.
12. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999); Albertsons, Inc., v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
13. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2161 (Breyer J., dissenting) (noting that the statute presented
the majority with this imperfect choice). At the oral argument of the Sutton case on April 27, 1999,
Justice Breyer had expressed his frustration with the definition's language to the attorneys, stating,
"I don't see how to get this statute to work." 67 U.S.L.W. 3664 (U.S. May 4, 1999).
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II. THE NECESSITY OF BROAD-RANGING ACTION TO COMBAT DISABILITY
DISCRIMINATION
Prejudice, whether inherent in human nature or learned, 4 may take many
forms, only some of which are disapproved of by society. If one defines
prejudice as assumptions based upon stereotype, then one may harbor
prejudices against an infinite variety of people. Asians, blonds, athletes,
convicted felons, teenagers, accountants, dog-owners, short people, or any
other identifiable group could, theoretically at least, become subjects of
prejudice and thus targets of discrimination. However, the law proscribes
discrimination only when it is based upon certain societally sanctioned
categories. In the United States, only relatively recently has disability joined
other categories such as race, sex, religion, and national origin as an
officially prohibited ground upon which to base certain decisions." Our
society has had specific reasons to single out particular types of prejudice for
legal sanction, and these reasons support the appropriateness of including
disability, broadly defined, among these categories.
A. Societal Consensus Regarding Unacceptable Prejudice
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifically prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, religion, and
sex. 16 It is worth contemplating why these categories have been specifically
chosen for protection against discrimination, while others have not. In the
last few decades, the prohibition on discrimination based upon these
categories has become so much a part of our culture that the categories may
seem inherently similar. However, the nature of each category in fact is
quite unique. Initially, it may seem logical to prohibit discrimination that is
14. See PHILIP PERLMUTTER, DIVIDED WE FALL: A HISTORY OF ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS, AND
RACIAL PREJUDICE IN AMERICA 49-52 (1992) (describing the ongoing debate as to whether
prejudice is an instinctive human characteristic or a learned behavior); see also PAUL GORDON
LAUREN, POWER AND PREJUDICE: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 5-
49 (1996) (describing the ancient origins of racial prejudice in human history).
15. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, passed in 1973, prohibits programs and activities
that receive federal assistance from discriminating on the basis of disability. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) (1994). The Americans with Disabilities Act, passed in 1990, prohibits disability
discrimination by certain employers, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(5)(A), 12112 (1994) (defining
employer), state and local governments, see id. §§ 12131(1), 12132 (defining public entity), and
public accommodations, see id. §§ 12182(a), 12181(7) (defining public accommodations).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin . . ").
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based upon a characteristic that an individual is powerless to change and thus
to limit the list of prohibited categories to those that are immutable. 7 Title
VII's list, however, does not follow this rule. Race, national origin, and sex
are generally considered in modem society to be immutable characteristics, 8
but religion is certainly not.'9 Moreover, there are many immutable or
nearly immutable characteristics, such as height or left-handedness, that do
not incur societal or legal censure when they become the bases of prejudice.
Further, the items on the Title VII list do not designate minorities in the
American population, even though some entries, such as race, were
originally intended to protect specific minority groups. 20  The statute, as
currently interpreted, prohibits discrimination based upon any race, 2' any
22 23sex, any national origin," or any religion (including lack of religion).24
Thus, its proscriptions turn not upon protected minority classes but rather on
universal characteristics. As a result, an individual can have standing to
bring a Title VII discrimination suit whether or not her race, sex, national
17. Immutability has long been a factor influencing the scope of antidiscrimination protection.
See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion) (applying the strict
scrutiny standard to a sex-based equal protection claim, in part because "sex, like race and national
origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth"); see also Peter J.
Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of Antidiscrimination Law, 97 MICH. L. REV.
564, 589 (1998) (noting that, traditionally, "one of the signs that discrimination is impermissible is
when it is directed against characteristics that . . . are immutable"); Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist
Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, "
108 YALE L.J. 485, 489 (1998) (noting "immutability" as a factor influencing equal protection
cases).
18. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686. Of course, it is possible in the modern world to change
one's sex through surgery, but because such a tiny minority of the population undergoes this type of
change, sex is still generally considered a permanent characteristic.
19. "The choice not to remain Jewish or Catholic is certainly more real than the choice not to
remain black." FREDERICK LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE 19 (1999) (discussing the immutability
of certain targeted characteristics in the context of bias crimes).
20. "Congress' primary concern in enacting the prohibition against racial discrimination in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was with 'the plight of the Negro in our economy."'
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202 (1979) (citing 110 CONG. REC.
6,548 (1964) (quoting remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
21. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287 (1976) (holding
that the race discrimination clause of Title VII prohibits discrimination against white people as well
as black people).
22. See, e.g., Sibley Mem'l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1340-41 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(noting that the sex discrimination clause of Title VII prohibits discrimination against men as well
as women).
23. See, e.g., Chacon v. Ochs, 780 F. Supp. 680, 680-81 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (stating that Title
VII "prohibits discrimination against individuals of all nationalities and origins").
24. See, e.g., Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 144-45 (5th Cir.
1975) (holding that the religious discrimination clause of Title VII prohibits discrimination against
members of specific religions as well as atheists).
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origin, or religion has historically been the target of societal prejudice.'
Therefore, there is no need to show that a particular group deserves
protection from discrimination; the statute offers its protection from race-,
sex-, national origin-, and religious-based discrimination to everyone.
Rather than immutability, minority, or historic oppression, the Title VII
list is based upon politics and pragmatism. Certainly, if large numbers of
decisionmakers are preventing individuals from working and otherwise
participating in society due to irrational stereotypes and prejudices, the polity
as a whole suffers because the rejected individuals cannot contribute their
skills and talents to society. Where a particular prejudice is widespread, it
will result in a greater cost to society, but it will also be likely to stir more
political pressure to combat it. The current debate in many states as to
whether to include sexual orientation as a protected category in
antidiscrimination and bias crime laws illustrates the political nature of the
debate.26 Indeed, "[a]s a descriptive matter, the scope of 'bias' adopted by a
25. Interestingly, however, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") does not
follow this model. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). It limits its protections to
plaintiffs age 40 or over. See id. § 631(a). One author has theorized that this protected-class
structure stems from the fact that the ADEA was designed to remedy a very narrow type of
discriminatory conduct. Specifically, as workers age, their productivity declines, and employers
are tempted to discharge these older workers. See George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The
Expanding Scope of Employment Discrimination Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 500 (1995)
(describing the "life cycle theory of earnings"). This temptation exists despite the fact that in prior
years, these workers were disproportionately productive, relative to their compensation. See id.
Thus, the ADEA was designed primarily to deter unfair terminations of these older workers. See
id. Further, because our society is used to dealing with apparently rational age restrictions on
activities such as voting, driving, and working, "[tihe prohibition against age discrimination is
likely to remain narrower than the prohibitions against race and sex discrimination so long as age is
a more acceptable basis for decisions in public and economic life." Id. at 498.
Some commentators have argued that by establishing a protected class that begins at age 40, the
ADEA has done a disservice to elderly citizens. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, AGING AND OLD
AGE 328 (1995) (noting that the ADEA "was 'sold' by means of emotional rhetoric concerning the
plight of the elderly, in 1967 still viewed as a disadvantaged segment of American society, even
though the Act seems to have been designed and to be administered in the interest primarily of
nonelderly workers"); see also Rutherglen, supra (criticizing the ADEA as primarily used by
middle-aged wealthy white professionals as opposed to less powerful workers). On the other end of
the spectrum, one commentator has criticized the establishment of any age cutoffs that would
restrict protection from age-based discrimination. See generally Bryan B. Woodruff, Note,
Unprotected Until Forty: The Limited Scope of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
73 IND. L.J. 1295 (1998) (criticizing the ADEA's protected-class structure and advocating an
amendment to the statute to allow it to protect all individuals from age-based discrimination).
26. See LAWRENCE, supra note 19, at 17-20 (discussing whether sexual orientation should be
included as a protected category in bias crime laws); see also JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY
POTIrER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW AND IDENTITY POLITICS 21 (1998) ("[T]he creation of
hate crime laws and jurisprudence will inevitably generate a contentious politics about which
prejudices count and which do not.").
1076 [Ariz. St. L.J.
ADA AND MITIGATING MEASURES
polity is a significant statement of its values and its sense of equality."2 7 One
can learn much about a society by studying the particular prejudices it deems
"politically salient. "28
B. The Addition of Disability to the List of "Politically Salient" Categories
of Discrimination
The modern American disability rights movement, which aims to secure
equal societal participation for people with mental and physical impairments,
began to gather strength in the late 1960s and early 1970s.29  Disabled
activists in this movement have refused to be marginalized and defined by the
larger non-disabled community. Underlying this refusal is the recognition
that disability itself is socially constructed.3 ° That is, society's categorization
of some people as "disabled" and others as "non-disabled" is entirely
arbitrary; it depends upon relative notions regarding the activities that human
beings should be able to perform and how they should be able to perform
them. 3' Indeed, one theoretician of disability issues believes that his "goal
should be to help 'normal' people to see the quotation marks around their
assumed state."3 2 Further, because disability is merely a social construct, the
27. LAWRENCE, supra note 19, at 3.
28. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 26, at 16.
29. See JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 41-73 (1993) (providing a comprehensive history of the American disability
rights movement).
30. For informative discussions of the social construction of disability, see generally Melinda
Jones & Lee Ann Basser Marks, Law and the Social Construction of Disability, in DISABILITY,
DIVERS-ABILITY AND LEGAL CHANGE 1 (Melinda Jones & Lee Ann Basser Marks eds., 1999)
[hereinafter DISABILITY, DIVERS-ABILITY AND LEGAL CHANGE]; CLAIRE LIACHOWITZ,
DISABILITY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT: LEGISLATIVE ROOTS (1988). See also LENNARD J. DAVIS,
ENFORCING NORMALCY: DISABILITY, DEAFNESS, AND THE BODY 1-22 (1995) (discussing the
social construction model); Tom Shakespeare, What Is a Disabled Person?, in DISABILITY, DIVERS-
ABILITY AND LEGAL CHANGE, supra, at 25, 29 (describing the "social creation" model of disability
as focusing not "on the individual, but on the social context which renders him or her disabled").
31. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., Who Are "Handicapped" Persons?, in THE LEGAL RIGHTS
OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND TEXT 1, 11 (Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr. ed.,
1980) ("[C]ertain traits have been singled out and called handicaps. The fine line between
handicapped and normal has been arbitrarily drawn by the 'normal' majority.") (footnote omitted);
NANCY L. EIESLAND, THE DISABLED GOD: TOWARD A LIBERATORY THEOLOGY OF DISABILITY 24
(1994) ("[P]eople with disabilities are distinguished not because of our shared physical,
psychological, or emotional traits, but because 'temporarily able-bodied' persons single us out for
differential treatment.").
32. DAVIS, supra note 30, at xii; see also Lennard J. Davis, The Rule of Normalcy: Politics
and Disability in the USA [United States of Ability], in DISABILITY, DIVERS-ABILITY AND LEGAL
CHANGE, supra note 30, at 35, 46 ("Whether we are talking about AIDS, low-birth weight babies,
special education issues, euthanasia, [or] the thousand other topics listed in the newspapers every
107731:1071
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idea of obtaining a definitive census of the population of individuals with
disabilities is impossible, despite the "countless head counts" that many
governments have attempted.33 Thus, disability activists do not strive to
achieve "normal" status for people with mental and physical impairments
because they recognize that normality-like disability-is a relative concept.
34
While society may try to enforce its notion of normality by urging disabled
people to go to painful or damaging lengths to resemble their non-disabled
counterparts,35 the appearance of normality is not nearly as important as the
right to participate in society.
Along with recognition of the social construction of disability has come
recognition of discrimination as the primary source of disadvantage for
disabled people. Disability theorists realize that the current configuration of
the world is not inevitable, and that its conscious or unconscious failure to
take into account the spectrum of human needs and abilities is itself
discriminatory. 36 Disabled people, like everyone else, have a right to live in
a world that allows them to use their skills and talents and to participate in
society. The provision of such opportunities is not a matter of charity for the
pitiful or rewards for the deserving.37 Instead, as the disability rights
movement has emphasized, it is a matter of right. 38  Further, although the
provision of equal opportunities to the disabled may at times require
day, the examination, discussion, [and] anatomising of this form of 'difference,' is nothing less than
a desperate attempt of people to consolidate their normality.").
33. Shakespeare, supra note 30, at 28. Shakespeare notes that because these surveys use
definitions of disability that are inevitably unstable, "the answers which this quantitative research
generates are more or less pointless." Id.
34. See DAVIS, supra note 30, at 24 ("[Tlhe problem is not the person with disabilities; the
problem is the way that normalcy is constructed to create the 'problem' of the disabled person.").
35. Joseph Shapiro reports that in the 1950's, society rewarded people with polio who
rejected wheelchairs and built up their muscles so that they could walk like non-disabled people
(albeit with braces and crutches). See SHAPIRO, supra note 29, at 15-16. Doctors at that time had
recommended crutches over wheelchairs not because they had evidence that walking was physically
more beneficial, but simply because "sociologically it was expected." Id. at 16. Ironically,
decades later, those who built the most muscle found that their muscles atrophied the fastest. See
id.
36. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability,
42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 517-18 (1997) (noting that the structuring of "services, facilities, programs
and opportunities" to meet the needs of non-disabled people, while ignoring the needs of those with
disabilities, constitutes discrimination).
37. For a discussion of the historic uses of charity and pity in misguided attempts to aid the
cause of people with disabilities, see Eichhorn, supra note 9, at 1417-18.
38. For an excellent history of the shift in American disability policy from charity to rights,
see RICHARD K. SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL
DISABILITY POLICY (1984).
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adjustment of the status quo,39 these adjustments are a matter of equal rights,
not "special" rights. This rights-based focus eventually yielded concrete
results for disability activists. As a result of changing American
consciousness, brought about in part by the disability rights movement and
its underlying theories, the category of "disability" was legislatively added to
the list of prohibited bases of discrimination.
40
C. The Need for a Broad Construction of Disability in the Discrimination
Context
Because disability is a fluid, socially constructed concept, it is in one
sense impossible to define. Nevertheless, people with disabilities have
sometimes been seen as constituting a distinct and identifiable minority
group.4 ' The boundaries of the minority group generally turn on the
presence of mental and physical impairments.42 However, because these
impairments and the disadvantages and needs that they generate are so wide-
ranging, the minority group model of disability has recently been criticized
as practically and theoretically unstable.43
Nevertheless, because there now exists societal consensus that
discrimination against qualified people on the basis of their disabilities is
wrong, and that people who suffer from mental or physical impairments
39. See infra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the ADA's requirement of
reasonable accommodations to allow equal access and opportunity to the disabled).
40. See infra Part III for a discussion of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, two pieces of legislation designed to combat disability discrimination.
41. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 30, at 3 (noting that "the term 'physical minorities' gives
more of a political sense to physical difference than the more abstract category 'disabled'");
EIESLAND, supra note 31, at 62 ("The minority-group model holds that the physical and
psychological restrictions that people with disabilities face are primarily due to prejudice and social
discrimination. . . ."); Jerome E. Bickenbach, Minority Rights or Universal Participation: The
Politics of Disablement, in DISABILITY, DIVERS-ABILITY AND LEGAL CHANGE, supra note 30, at
101, 102-06 (describing the minority group model of disability and its proponents).
42. See Shakespeare, supra note 30, at 26, 30 (describing the "deficit" definition of
disability, which is based upon impairment, and explaining how some activists have used the
definition to identify a distinct minority group of people with disabilities); see also JENNY MORRIS,
PRIDE AGAINST PREJUDICE 183 (1991) (equating "[t]he experience of aging, of being ill, of being
in pain, of physical and intellectual limitations" with the "experience of disability").
43. For example, one commentator has observed:
[Tlhe minority group analysis is based upon a forced analogy between racial
minorities and disabled people that breaks down at many important points. Not
only are the social responses to different forms of mental and physical
impairments vastly different; from the other direction, there is almost no
commonality of experience, or feelings of solidarity, between people with
diverse disabilities.
Bickenbach, supra note 41, at 106.
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should have reasonable freedom from the social and physical barriers that
prevent their participation in society, 44 there persists a need to define
disability in order to enforce these rights. If the primary societal harm
caused by disability discrimination is society's lost opportunity to benefit
from the skills and talents of people with disabilities who are prevented from
participating in the community due to irrational fears and stereotypes,' then
it makes sense to define disability broadly for purposes of combating this
type of discrimination. Attempts to narrow the definition to cover only those
who somehow "deserve" protection overlook the fact that freedom from
discrimination is not a privilege but a right. Historically, models of
disability based upon deserving and charity have served neither the interests
of people with disabilities nor those of society at large.' Thus, rather than
singling out a narrow class of conspicuous, oppressed, or deserving
individuals, laws designed to combat disability discrimination, ideally,
should cover all people who suffer the ill effects of irrational or unfounded
judgments based upon their impairments.
III. LEGISLATION DESIGNED TO COMBAT DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION: THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990
A. Background Regarding the ADA's Passage
A significant predecessor of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 197341
represents Congress's first attempt to prohibit disability-based discrimination
on a large scale. Section 504 of the Act, as currently codified, states that
"[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States...
shall, solely by reason of his or her disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
44. This consensus is evidenced by two pieces of legislation, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. For a discussion of these two statutes, see infra
Part III.
45. The Findings section of the ADA reflects this rationale for combating disability-based
discrimination: "the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice
denies people with disabilities the opportunity . . . to pursue those opportunities for which our free
society is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses
resulting from dependency and nonproductivity." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (1994).
46. See MORRIS, supra note 42, at 176-78 (noting that charitable organizations for disabled
people have served largely to reinforce damaging notions of powerlessness among individuals with
disabilities).
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ... ,,4"
Senate staff members had drafted section 504 using as a model Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 which prohibits discrimination by recipients
of federal funds on the grounds of race, color, or national origin."0
While the Rehabilitation Act marked a significant step toward the
elimination of disability-based discrimination, it has, from its inception,
covered only recipients of federal financial assistance and not private
employers. The ADA, passed in 1990, rectifies this situation by specifically
prohibiting discrimination in the contexts of employment, 5' public services,52
and public accommodations operated by private entities.53 In addition, the
Act describes in detail the type of conduct it proscribes. For example, in the
employment context, it specifically prohibits "limiting, segregating, or
classifying" an individual adversely because of a disability, 4 using criteria or
tests that have a discriminatory effect," and failing to provide reasonable
accommodations that allow disabled employees to participate fully in the
workplace. 6 Further, the ADA charged the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") with the task
of promulgating even more specific regulations to implement the statutory
provisions.57 The ADA was signed into law on July 26, 1990, and has been
hailed as "the greatest single achievement of the disability rights movement
to date.
58
48. Id. § 794(a).
49. See SCOTCH, supra note 38, at 52. For a description of the history of section 504 based
upon interviews with congressional staffers, see id. at 45-48.
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) ("No person ... shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.").
51. Title I of the ADA covers employers with 15 or more employees. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5)(A) (1994).
52. Title II of the ADA covers state and local governments. See id. § 12132.
53. Title III of the ADA covers public accommodations, including restaurants, laundromats,
grocery stores, private schools, day care centers, and many other establishments. See id.
§§ 12181(7), 12182.
54. Id. § 12112(b)(1).
55. Seeid. § 12112(b)(3), (6)-(7).
56. See id. § 12112(b)(5). Title III of the ADA contains similarly specific prohibitions
applicable to public accommodations. See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)-(v).
57. See id. §§ 12111(1), 12116 (granting the EEOC authority to issue regulations
implementing Title I of the ADA, which is codified at §§ 12111-12117); id. § 12134(a) (granting
the Attorney General authority to issue regulations implementing Title II of the ADA, which is
codified at §§ 12131-12164); id. § 12186(b) (authorizing the Attorney General to issue regulations
implementing Title III of the ADA, which is codified at §§ 12181-12189).
58. FRED PELKA, THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 18, 20 (1997).
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B. The ADA's Anti-Discrimination Provisions
1. The Protected Class
Unlike federal statutes prohibiting other types of discrimination, 9 the
ADA limits its coverage to a specific protected class.' Specifically, the
ADA states that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to" matters of employment.6" With respect to public services, the
ADA states that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination."62 Therefore, under the statute, a plaintiff must first prove
that he or she is a "qualified individual with a disability" before the plaintiff
will have a chance to prove that the defendant engaged in discriminatory
conduct. This protected class element is explicit in Titles I and II, which
cover private employers and state and local governments, respectively.63
Even under the public accommodations provisions of Title III, where the
statute is not phrased in terms of a "qualified individual with a disability,"
plaintiffs must first prove their disabled status in order to pursue a
discrimination suit.64
The statute's protected-class structure thus creates a unique preliminary
hurdle for ADA plaintiffs. While an African-American man bringing a race
discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 need not
prove his racial status, 65 the ADA plaintiff is forced to prove a disability in
59. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (describing Title VII's coverage of all
races, religions, national origins, and sexes). But see supra note 25 (describing the age-based
protected class created by the ADEA).
60. See Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 441-44
(1991) (criticizing the "protected-class" structure of the ADA's protections); Burgdorf, supra note
36, at 423-27 (criticizing the "protected-class" structure of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
which the ADA adopted).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994).
62. Id. § 12132.
63. See id. § 12112(a) (Title I); id. § 12132 (Title II).
64. The Title III prohibition states simply that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against
on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of . . . any place of public
accommodation . . . ." Id. § 12182(a). Nevertheless, even under Title III, a plaintiff has the
burden of proving that she has a "disability." See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 630-31 (1998)
(requiring a Title III ADA plaintiff to meet the statutory definition of "disability").
65. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. If such requirements existed, proving race in
some cases could be harder than one would first imagine. See, e.g., Christine B. Hickman, The
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accordance with the statutory definition before a court can even consider
whether the defendant discriminated because of a disability.6 Indeed, many
ADA suits founder at this preliminary stage.67
The ADA inherited its "protected class" structure from section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.68 While no legislative history explains why
section 504 was drafted to protect only a "qualified handicapped
individual" 69 (later changed to an "otherwise qualified individual with a
disability"), 70 one scholar has speculated that the drafters7' of section 504
hastily included this language to clarify that the prohibition on disability
discrimination would not require employers to hire unqualified people.72 The
creation of a protected class was not necessary to accomplish this purpose,
however. The ADA already explicitly allows employers to use criteria that
"tend to screen out . . . an individual with a disability," provided that the
criteria are "job-related and consistent with business necessity." 73  Even if
the term "qualified" were needed to clarify that employers and public entities
Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African Americans, and the U. S. Census,
95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1242-44 (1997) (rejecting essentialist concepts of racial identity); Kenneth
E. Payson, Check One Box: Reconsidering Directive No. 15 and the Classification of Mixed-Race
People, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1239-42 (1997) (analyzing the social construction of race); john a.
powell, The Multiple Self: Exploring Between and Beyond Modernity and Postmodernity, 81 MINN.
L. REV. 1481, 1498-1500 (1997) (criticizing the dualism with which society views racial identity).
66. See, e.g., Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 149 (2d Cir.
1998); Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 1998); Olson v. Dubuque
Community Sch. Dist., 137 F.3d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1998); Still v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc.,
120 F.3d 50, 51 (5th Cir. 1997); Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997).
67. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (noting that a substantial percentage of ADA
suits between 1992 and 1998 were dismissed, many because of the plaintiffs' inability to meet the
statutory definition of "disability").
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) (stating that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a
disability" shall be subject to discrimination because of the disability).
69. See Burgdorf, supra note 36, at 427.
70. Congress substituted the new wording in 1992. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, § 102, 106 Stat. 4346, 4360 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a)) (1994).
71. For a detailed account of the drafting of Section 504 by congressional staffers, see
SCOTCH, supra note 38, at 51-52.
72. See Burgdorf, supra note 36, at 428. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
("HEW"), which issued regulations and interpretive guidelines regarding section 504, sought to
reassure recipients of federal funds that the words "otherwise qualified" were not meant to be read
literally. The Department of Justice ("DOJ"), to which section 504 enforcement authority was
transferred in 1980, adopted verbatim the HEW guidance on this point: "[uinder such a literal
reading, a blind person possessing all the qualifications for driving a bus except sight could be said
to be 'otherwise qualified' for the job of driving. Clearly, such a result was not intended by
Congress." 45 C.F.R. § 84, app. A(5) (1998) (discussing the definition of "qualified handicapped
individual").
73. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (1994).
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could establish bona fide eligibility criteria, there is still no apparent need for
the word "handicapped" or "disabled" to appear in the same phrase.
The protected class structure of the ADA may also stem from a societal
belief in a class of "truly disabled" people, and a fear that people outside of
this group will somehow take advantage of antidiscrimination laws.74 As
disability scholars have noted, society is willing to protect those it considers
disabled, but only so long as they conform to societal stereotypes.75 In
addition, the protected class formulation coincides with society's tendency to
see disability as a personal trait rather than a social construct,76 and with
society's tendency to draw lines between "disabled" people and "non-
disabled" people, even if those lines are arbitrary in the end.77
2. The "Disability" Definition
Because ADA plaintiffs must prove their "disabled" status in order to
maintain a discrimination suit, the way in which the statute defines
"disability" is crucial to any case. Titles I, II, and III of the ADA each
incorporate the following definition of "disability":
74. Courts have read this rationale into the Rehabilitation Act's disability definition, whether
or not it was originally there. See, e.g., Daley v. Koch, 892 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting
that the Rehabilitation Act was not intended to cover "commonplace" personality disorders); Forrisi
v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986) ("The Rehabilitation Act assures that truly disabled,
but genuinely capable, individuals will not face discrimination . . . . It would debase this high
purpose if the statutory protections available to those truly handicapped could be claimed by anyone
whose disability was minor . . . ."). Some recent commentators have similarly expressed
discontent that "untraditional" or "undeserving" plaintiffs may resort to statutory protection from
disability discrimination. See, e.g., WALTER OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: How EMPLOYMENT
LAW IS PARALYZING THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 2 (1997) (lamenting the fact that "'[t]raditional'
disabled groups-the deaf, blind, and paraplegic-now account for only a small share of ADA job
complaints"); Erica Worth Harris, Controlled Impairments Under the Americans with Disabilities
Act: A Search for the Meaning of "Disability," 73 WASH. L. REV. 575, 575 (1998) (criticizing
broad interpretations of the disability definition as allowing "undeserving" plaintiffs to come under
the coverage of the statute).
75. See, e.g., PELKA, supra note 58, at 305 (discussing the stereotype of the "Tiny Tim,"
and describing this figure as "the cheerful 'handicapped' person, grateful for any crumbs");
SHAPIRO, supra note 29, at 16-18 (discussing stereotypical stories of people with disabilities
characterized as inspirational); Burgdorf, supra note 36, at 534-35 (stating that disabled persons
resist being characterized as "special," "inspirational," or "courageous").
76. For a discussion of the social construction of disability, see Eichhorn, supra note 9, at
1409-14.
77. See Jones & Basser Marks, supra note 30, at 19 ("For people with disabilities the quest
to be treated as ordinary members of the community is challenged by laws which are only available
on proof of abnormality."); Ruth Colker, Bi: Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Disability,
56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 60-64 (1995) (criticizing the ADA's bipolar categorization of people based
upon the presence or absence of some arbitrarily identified "disability").
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The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual-
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.78
This definition comes directly from the Rehabilitation Act, to which it had
been added by amendment in 1974.79  Legislative history regarding the
Rehabilitation Act's anti-discrimination provision in section 504 reveals that
the three-pronged definition was designed to address different types of
disability discrimination.' The first prong was meant to address direct
discrimination based on actual disability and to provide a definition to
facilitate the statute's disability-based affirmative action requirements.8 ' The
remaining two prongs were designed to address discrimination stemming
from classification of and perceptions regarding disabilities.'
a. Prong One: "Actual Disability"
Under the first prong of the definition, a plaintiff must prove that he or
she has a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits" a "major
life activit[y]. "83 Litigants rarely disagree over the "physical or mental
impairment" element; regulations define this element rather broadly as any
"physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting . . . the . . .neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense
organs, respiratory, . . . cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-
urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, [or] endocrine" systems.'
Alternatively, the regulations include "[a]ny mental or psychological disorder
such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
79. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111(a), 88 Stat.
1617, 1619 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) (1994)).
80. See S. REP. NO. 93-1297, at 38 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6389-90.
81. See id. at 39, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6390 (stating that the affirmative action
obligations of 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (Supp. V 1975) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1994))
can be fulfilled only by the hiring and advancement of persons with actual disabilities, rather than
persons marginally or previously handicapped or persons 'regarded as' handicapped").
82. See id. at 38-39, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6388-90.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
84. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1999) (EEOC regulation implementing Title I of the ADA);
28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1999) (DOJ regulation implementing Title II of the ADA); 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.104 (1999) (DOJ regulation implementing Title III of the ADA).
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illness, and specific learning disabilities. "85 Regulations promulgated by the
DOJ implementing Titles II and III of the ADA go on to list specific
maladies that qualify as impairments. 86  The non-exhaustive list includes
"orthopedic, visual, speech and hearing impairments, . . epilepsy, . .
multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation,
emotional illness, learning disabilities, [and] HIV."87
When the plaintiffs disabled status is at issue in an ADA case, the "major
life activity" and "substantially limits" elements tend to constitute the
battleground a.8  Regulations of the EEOC and the DOJ define "major life
activities" as "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working."
89
However, when a plaintiffs argument is based upon an activity not on this
list, little guidance is available to courts trying to determine whether the
given activity is "major."' Creative arguments have invoked activities
85. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (1999) (EEOC regulation implementing Title I of the ADA);
28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (1999) (DOJ regulation implementing Title II of the ADA); 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.104 (1999) (DOJ regulation implementing Title III of the ADA).
86. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 36.104 (1999) (defining the phrase "physical or mental
impairment").
87. 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104(1)(ii), 36.104(1)(iii) (1999).
88. See Eichhorn, supra note 9, at 1435-1460 (reviewing judicial interpretations of the
"major life activity" and "substantially limits" elements); see also Burgdorf, supra note 36, at 438-
513 (criticizing courts' focus upon and narrow reading of the "substantially limits" element).
89. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1999) (EEOC); see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 36.104 (1999)
(DOJ).
90. See Eichhorn, supra note 9, at 1440-50 (discussing unsettled questions arising under the
major life activities" element, including whether the given activity must be of major personal
significance to the individual plaintiff).
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ranging from growing9' and caring for others92 to commuting,
93 taking tests, 94
and flying in airplanes,95 with varying degrees of success.
In addition, the "substantially limits" element has proved a very high
hurdle indeed for many ADA plaintiffs because courts have generally
construed this language quite strictly.96 EEOC regulations interpret this
element to mean that a plaintiff must prove that he or she is
[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in
the general population can perform; or ... [s]ignificantly
restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which [he
or she] can perform a particular major life activity as compared
to ... the average person in the general population. 97
Courts relying on these regulations have held plaintiffs to a very high
standard. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, for example, held that a plaintiff was not disabled despite his
allegation that he had muscle weakness, residual paralysis from polio, one
leg longer than the other, and an approximate total body impairment of
91. See United States v. Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1081 (W.D. Wis.
1998) (the court avoided the question of whether growing was a major life activity by stating that
the child in question was growing).
92. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that
caring for others is not a major life activity under the ADA).
93. See Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 168 F.3d 1228, 1231-32 (10th Cir.
1999) (holding that, in a case where the plaintiff claimed she was limited in commuting, the trial
court had erred in not instructing the jury to consider a specific major life activity). But see id. at
1234 (Lucero, J., dissenting) ("Given the nature of our geographically dispersed, transportation-
dependent society and the ubiquity of commuting, it is certainly debatable whether commuting is an
activity of sufficient 'significance' to deserve 'inclusion under the statutory rubric' of major life
activity.") (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998)).
94. See Tatum v. NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1123 (E.D. Mo. 1998). While the plaintiff
had argued that he was substantially limited in the major life activity of test taking, the Tatum court,
in denying his motion for a preliminary injunction, did not explore the issue because it questioned
the plaintiffs likelihood of success on the merits regarding his need for accommodation. See id.
95. See Cannizzaro v. Neiman Marcus, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 465, 476 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(finding no support in the regulations or case law for the argument that flying is a major life
activity).
96. See generally Burgdorf, supra note 36 (criticizing the narrow interpretation of this
element, which allows courts to dismiss disability suits summarily before plaintiffs can present
evidence regarding the allegedly discriminatory conduct of defendants). For a sampling of cases
construing the "substantially limits" element narrowly, see Eichhorn, supra note 9, at 1452-53.
97. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(1) (1999). In addition, the regulations specify that courts should
consider "(i) [t]he nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or expected duration of
the impairment; and (iii) [tihe permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long
term impact of or resulting from the impairment" when deciding if the impairment is substantially
limiting. Id. § 1630.20)(2) (1999).
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fifteen percent.98 The court reasoned that "[a]lthough plaintiff cannot walk
briskly, and has some trouble climbing stairs .... his ability to walk is not
substantially limited nor significantly restricted. ""
When the major life activity at issue is working, a plaintiff's chances of
proving a disability are even lower because agencies and courts have equated
the notion of working with general employability rather than with the ability
to perform a particular job. EEOC regulations, for example, state that to be
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, a plaintiff must be
significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a
broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person
having comparable training, skills, and abilities. "The inability to perform a
single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major
life activity of working. "'0
Therefore, even an impairment that completely prevents a person from
working in a specific job of his or her choice-or in a specialized class of
jobs-does not substantially limit him or her in the major life activity of
working. While this one-job-is-not-enough rule has been roundly
criticized,"' it is well settled in the case law.'O°
98. See Stone v. Entergy Servs., Inc., No. 94-2669, 1995 WL 368473, at *2-4 (E.D. La.
June 20, 1995).
99. Id. at *4.
100. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1999).
101. See, e.g., RUTH COLKER, AMERICAN LAW IN THE AGE OF HYPERCAPITALISM: THE
WORKER, THE FAMILY, AND THE STATE 83-86 (1998) (criticizing the one-job-is-not-enough rule
under the ADA as unnecessary and unduly harsh); Richard A. Bales, Once Is Enough: Evaluating
When a Person Is Substantially Limited in Her Ability to Work, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 203, 235-42
(1993) (criticizing courts' application of the one-job-is-not-enough rule under the Rehabilitation Act
as imposing an unreasonable burden on plaintiffs and leading to illogical, inequitable results);
Burgdorf, supra note 36, at 439-69 (criticizing the one-job-is-not-enough rule in decisions under the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA); Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class:
Redefining the Scope of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
107, 116 (1997) (criticizing as inequitable the burden placed upon ADA plaintiffs who must prove
general limitations in employability); Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act
Interpreting the Title I Regulations: The Hard Cases, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2-6 (1992)
(criticizing the inconsistent results arising from the ADA regulations regarding substantial
limitations in working).
102. See, e.g., Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 1998);
Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-
Am., Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996); Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 727
(5th Cir. 1995); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942-43 (10th Cir. 1994).
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b. Prongs Two and Three: Record of Disability and Being Regarded as
Having a Disability
The second and third prongs of the ADA's disability definition indicate
that a plaintiff may be disabled based upon society's prior observations and
perceptions. However, both of these prongs incorporate elements from the
first prong, and they therefore raise many of the same hurdles that plaintiffs
encounter under the "actual disability" prong. The "record of" prong, for
example, states that a disability can consist of "a record of such an
impairment."0 3  "Such an impairment" refers to an "impairment that
substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities," as mentioned in
the first prong."° Similarly, the "regarded as" prong language refers back to
"being regarded as having such an impairment" and thus raises identical
issues. 05 Litigants rarely invoke the "record of" prong,'0 6 perhaps because it
becomes necessary only when a plaintiff no longer suffers from an actual
disability that would qualify under prong one. Moreover, plaintiffs who
have suffered adverse employment actions before their impairments have led
to debilitating symptoms have found little help in the "record of" prong,1 7
despite EEOC guidelines indicating that their impairments were meant to be
covered. 10
8
The "regarded as" prong, despite having been intended to cover those
whose limitations stem only from the attitudes of others toward an actual or
perceived impairment,109 has proved to be of little more help to plaintiffs than
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994).
104. Id. § 12102(2)(A).
105. Id. § 12102(2)(C).
106. This observation comes from my own experience in researching ADA cases. I have
found no formal study as yet comparing the rates at which plaintiffs have relied upon the various
prongs of the disability definition.
107. See, e.g., Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that plaintiff who required a modified work schedule to accommodate treatment for breast cancer
did not have "record of" disability because she was able to continue to work and thus not
substantially limited); Hirsch v. National Mall & Serv., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 977, 981-82 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (stating that plaintiff failed to show that her late husband had a "record of" disability where
his ultimately fatal lymphoma caused only occasional absences from work before his discharge).
108. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k), app. (1999) (noting that the "record of" prong of the ADA
protects former cancer patients from discrimination based on their prior medical history"); see
also S. REP. No. 93-1297, at 38-39 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6389 (noting
that the "record of" prong in the Rehabilitation Act covers "persons who have recovered-in whole
or in part-from a handicapping condition, such as ... cancer").
109. See H.R. REP. No 101-485, pt. 2, at 53 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
335; see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104, 36.104 (1999); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(2) (1999); School Bd. v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (noting that by including the "regarded as" prong in the
Rehabilitation Act's three-prong disability definition, "Congress acknowledged that society's
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the "record of" prong. Reading the statutory language literally, courts have
held that a plaintiff proceeding under the "regarded as" prong must prove
that other people have regarded him or her as being substantially limited in a
major life activity."' This literal reading contradicts more expansive
interpretations in the legislative history, which specify that "[a] person who
is excluded from any basic life activity, or is otherwise discriminated
against, because of a covered entity's negative attitudes toward that person's
impairment is treated as having a disability,""' and that "a person who is
rejected from a job [because of] myths, fears and stereotypes" regarding
disabilities is covered by the "regarded as" prong "whether or not the
employer's perception was shared by others in the field."" 2  Nevertheless,
the judicial trend ' 3 has been to focus on the ADA's literal language, even
though this evidence indicates that it may not coincide with Congress's
intent. 114
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical
limitations that flow from actual impairment").
110. See, e.g., Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d 156, 172-74 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(basing analysis of the "regarded as" prong on whether the employer regarded the employee as
having a substantially limiting impairment, rather than on whether the employer's attitude toward
the employee's HIV status caused his dismissal), overruled by Betts v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23105 (Sept. 22, 1999); Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382,
385 (8th Cir. 1995) (requiring that "other people treat [the plaintiff] as having a substantially
limiting impairment" in order for the plaintiff to qualify as disabled under the "regarded as"
prong).
111. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 53, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 335
(emphasis added); see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (1989) ("A person who is excluded from
any activity covered under this Act or is otherwise discriminated against because of a covered
entity's negative attitudes towards disability is being treated as having a disability which affects a
major life activity.").
112. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 30, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 453.
113. The trend of interpreting the "regarded as" prong literally-and thus narrowly-when the
major life activity at issue is working is traceable to an oft-cited Rehabilitation Act decision from
the Fourth Circuit. See Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986). This case articulated the
"general foreclosure" rule, holding that "[t]he statutory reference to a substantial limitation
indicates . . . that an employer regards an employee as handicapped in his or her ability to work by
finding the employee's impairment to foreclose generally the type of employment involved." Id. at
935. To interpret the "regarded as" prong more broadly, the court explained, would "debase" the
Act's high purpose of assuring that "truly disabled, but genuinely capable, individuals will not face
discrimination. . . ." Id. at 934.
114. For criticisms of narrow judicial interpretations of the "regarded as" prong, see
Eichhorn, supra note 9, at 1462-68 (arguing that a plaintiff who suffers "a single negative reaction"
should qualify as disabled under the "regarded as" prong, even though this result "contradicts the
literal language of the statute," because the result "appears to coincide with legislative intent");
Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As" Prong: Giving Effect to
Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 597 (1997) (stating that "the cases cited in the
legislative history of the ADA . . .require[ ] only that an individual suffer an adverse employment
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IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE ADA'S DISABILITY DEFINITION TO
PLAINTIFFS WHO EMPLOY MITIGATING MEASURES TO COMBAT THE
EFFECTS OF THEIR IMPAIRMENTS
While the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA themselves represent a societal
consensus that discrimination on the basis of disability is wrong, the
imprecise definition of disability in each statute leaves the scope of this
wrong open to debate."' In cases concerning plaintiffs whose impairments
are mitigated through medication or corrective devices, the meaning of the
statutory definition of disability is unfortunately ambiguous. As a matter of
principle, when a person suffers discrimination because of a physical or
mental impairment, the wrongness of this discrimination should not depend
upon whether the impairment's effects are mitigated through medication or
corrective devices. After all, if the discriminating actor is basing his or her
actions on beliefs about the impairment and its potential to cause harm in an
unmitigated state, then courts assessing the victim's discrimination claim
should similarly consider the impairment without regard to mitigating
measures." 6  In addition, if the defendant has discriminated because of a
distaste for the mitigating measure itself, as in the case of an employer being
disturbed by the appearance of a prosthesis, it seems similarly illogical to
exclude the impaired individual from the ADA's protections simply because
the individual's prosthesis can restore normal functioning. Although the
DOJ, 117 the EEOC," the legislative history," 9 and the majority of circuit
action based on physical or mental criteria, not that the individual experience widespread
discrimination in order to be regarded as substantially limited") (emphases added).
115. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (setting forth the disability definition that
appears in both statutes).
116. One scholar, who feels strongly that courts should generally ignore mitigating measures
in the disability analysis, has written that "[wlhere an employer requires an employee's uncorrected
or untreated condition to satisfy a particular standard, the disability determination will be made
without regard to corrective or mitigating measures . . . ." Harris, supra note 74, at 597. Because
she feels that this analysis should occur "regardless of" regulatory instructions to ignore mitigating
measures, this commentator presumably believes that this strategy carries its own inherent logic.
Id. The Supreme Court, however, does not share this belief. See infra Part V (describing recent
Supreme Court holdings directing courts to take mitigating measures into account during the
disability analysis).
117. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 app. A (1999); id. § 36.104 app. B (1999).
118. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) app. (1999) (defining "impairment"); id. § 1630.2(j), app.
(1998) (defining "substantially limits").
119. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
334 ("Whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of
mitigating measures . . . ."); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451 ("The impairment should be assessed without considering whether
mitigating measures ... would result in a less-than-substantial limitation."); S. REP. No., 101-116,
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courts" have historically agreed that the use of mitigating measures should
not disqualify an otherwise disabled person from statutory coverage, the
literal language of the ADA's disability definition allows room for other
interpretations.
A. Mitigating Measures Under the "Actual Disability" Prong
Many people with physical or mental impairments can control the effects
of their impairments with medication, corrective devices, or other measures.
For example, a person with diabetes may be able to control the harmful
effects of her disease by taking insulin. Someone with very poor hearing
may overcome or at least mitigate this problem by wearing a hearing aid. A
person who has lost a limb may depend upon a prosthesis to restore
something close to normal functioning. Whether any of these people would
qualify as "disabled" under the first prong of the ADA's disability definition
depends upon whether their impairments substantially limit them in a major
life activity and thus upon the interpretation of the words "substantially
limits" as they appear in the statute. 12 1 Because the statutory text does not
say anything about mitigating measures such as those listed above, several
interpretations of the key words are possible in this context.
First, one could focus on the impairment and assume that because
Congress did not mention mitigating measures, it expected courts to assess
the limitations caused by the impairment without regard to such measures.
This interpretation indeed coincides with congressional intent as indicated in
legislative history." It also coincides with the majority of recent circuit
at 23 (1989) ("[W]hether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the
availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids.").
120. See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 866 (1st Cir. 1998) (following
the EEOC guidance stating that courts should assess whether an impairment substantially limits a
major life activity without regard to mitigating measures); Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law
Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999) (same); Baert v.
Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir. 1998) (same); Matczak v. Frankford Candy &
Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997) (same); Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d
624, 627-28 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1048 (1998) (same); Harris v. H & W
Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-21 (lth Cir. 1996) (same); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc.,
87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1162 (1997) (same). But see Murphy v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table opinion), aff'd,
119 S. Ct. 2133, 2136 (1999) (same); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th
Cir. 1997), aff'd, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2144 (1999) (rejecting EEOC guidance); Gilday v. Mecosta
Cty., 124 F.3d 760, 766-68 (6th Cir. 1997) (same).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994).
122. See supra note 119.
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court decisions on the subject." Further, because courts interpreting
identical language under the Rehabilitation Act had uniformly disregarded
mitigating measures when assessing controlled impairments, 24 and because
the ADA specifically instructs courts to interpret the ADA no more narrowly
than they had the Rehabilitation Act,"z the refusal to take mitigating
measures into account also coincides with the actual text of the ADA.
Finally, this interpretation is buttressed by agency guidance.' 26 The EEOC,
for example, provides the following examples of how courts should interpret
the "substantially limits" language in mitigating measures cases:
An individual who uses artificial legs would . . . be substantially
limited in the major life activity of walking because the individual
is unable to walk without the aid of prosthetic devices. Similarly,
a diabetic who without insulin would lapse into a coma would be
substantially limited because the individual cannot perform major
life activities without the aid of medication. 1
27
However, one could also read the statutory terms more narrowly and
follow a very strict plain language approach. 12' Because the words
"substantially limits" appear in the present indicative, rather than the
conditional, one could argue that they require courts to assess the actual,
present condition of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff is using some type of
mitigating measure that has an actual, present effect on the impact of the
123. See supra note 120.
124. See Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) (epilepsy), amended by
Mantolete v. Bolger, 38 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1517 (9th Cir. 1985); Bentivegna v. United
States Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982) (diabetes); Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp.,
677 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 465 U.S. 1095 (1984), on remand, 735 F.2d 359 (9th Cir.
1985), rev'd 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (diabetes); Davis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 662 F.2d 120 (2d
Cir. 1981) (epilepsy); Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (diabetes), aff'd,
865 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989); Salmon Pineiro v. Lehman, 653 F. Supp. 483 (D.P.R. 1987)
(epilepsy); Martin v. Cardinal Glennon Mem'l Hosp. for Children, 599 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Mo.
1984) (diabetes); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co., 579 F. Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(epilepsy); Cain v. Archdiocese of Kansas City, 508 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Kan. 1981) (epilepsy);
Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (epilepsy).
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994) (providing that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this
chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards
applied under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794(e) (1994)] or the
regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title").
126. See supra note 118.
127. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) app. (1999). For a general discussion of the deference that courts
should give to the EEOC's guidance on the mitigating measures issue, see Colker, supra note 3, at
153-56.
128. For an argument in favor of a plain language approach in this context, see Michael J.
Puma, Note, Respecting the Plain Language of the ADA: A Textualist Argument Rejecting the
EEOC's Analysis of Controlled Disabilities, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123 (1998).
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impairment, then the mitigating measure should be taken into account.
While this reading does not account for Congress's intentions as expressed in
the legislative history, 29 a plain language adherent would argue that the best
indication of what Congress meant to say is what it said; that is, if the
statutory language is unambiguous, then it is wrong to resort to legislative
history or other outside sources to determine its meaning. 3 ' Of course, plain
language theorists and others may well differ in this case as to whether the
statutory language at issue is ambiguous in the first place. 3 ' Nevertheless, in
the end, following the plain language approach when interpreting the "actual
disability" prong furthers the philosophy of those who believe that one can
identify the "truly disabled" and that impairment-based discrimination is
wrong only when aimed at this identifiable class. 32 This approach, however,
leaves open an important question regarding the treatment of plaintiffs who
cannot or will not use mitigating measures that may be available.' 
33
In 1998, the Fifth Circuit adopted yet another interpretation, deciding to
consider mitigating measures only if they "amount to permanent corrections
129. See supra note 119.
130. For an example of a federal district court taking this position, see Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz
Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 812 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (finding the words "substantially limits" to be
unambiguous and noting that where the "language of a statute is unambiguous, this Court has no
need to and will not defer to extrinsic aids or legislative history") (quoting Guilzon v. Comm'r,
985 F.2d 819, 823-24 n.11 (5th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Puma,
supra note 128, at 124-29 (finding the words "substantially limits" to be unambiguous and therefore
advocating rejection of agency guidelines and legislative history insofar as these sources indicate
that courts should ignore mitigating measures in the disability analysis).
131. Because the statutory language focuses on the "impairment" as the source of the
substantial limitation, it may not be so "plain" that the text excludes those who use corrective
devices from the group of individuals with substantially limiting impairments. One can imagine the
response that a person using a hearing aid would give when asked whether she has an impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity: "Of course! Do you think that I wear this hearing aid
for fun?"
Courts have historically differed as well as to the "plain" meaning of this part of the statute.
Compare Sicard v. City of Sioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1436 (N.D. Iowa 1996) ("The plain
meaning of 'impairment' is only the untreated condition.") with Schluter v. Indus. Coils, Inc.,
928 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (noting that to consider the impairment in an untreated
condition is to "read out of the [ADA]" the plain meaning of the requirement that the impairment
substantially limit a major life activity). Of course, the mere fact that reasonable opinion has
differed as to the interpretation of the statutory text indicates that it has no one plain, unambiguous
meaning.
132. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
133. To date, only a few courts employing a plain language approach have faced this question.
See Van Stan v. Fancy Colours & Co., 125 F.3d 563, 570 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that "plaintiff[s]
cannot recover under the ADA if through [their] own fault [they] fail[ ] to control an otherwise
controllable illness"); Pangalos v. Prudential Ins. Co., No. 96-0167, 1996 WL 612469, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 15, 1996), aff'd on other grounds, 118 F.3d 1577 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff's
colitis was not a disability where it could be remedied through colostomy).
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or ameliorations." 34 Deferring to EEOC guidance but reading it narrowly,
the court noted that "nothing in the [EEOC's] Interpretive Guidelines or the
legislative history . . . suggests that all impairments must be considered in
their unmitigated states." 35  Therefore, the court held that "only serious
impairments and ailments that are analogous to those mentioned in the EEOC
Guidelines and the legislative history-diabetes, epilepsy, and hearing
impairments-will be considered in their unmitigated state."136 It further
explained that such impairments "must be serious in common parlance, and
they must require that the individual use mitigating measures on a frequent
basis, that is, he must put on his prosthesis every morning or take his
medication with some continuing regularity." 137 In contrast, the court listed
"an artificial joint or a pin or a transplanted organ" as examples of
permanent corrections that would be taken into account in the disability
analysis. 3  Earlier that same year, a federal district court hit upon a similar
pragmatic approach. The United States District Court for the Western
District of Wisconsin decided to employ a sliding scale, disregarding
mitigating measures when they lack proven long-term effectiveness' 39 and
taking account of them when they do."4  This approach, while original,
would likely prove difficult to administer consistently over time, as new
mitigating measures appear and old ones are improved.
134. Washington v. HCA Health Servs., Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated,
119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999).
135. Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 471. This approach, with its emphasis on the visibility and inconvenience of the
mitigating measures, coincides with the theory that an identifiable class of "truly" disabled people
exists, and that this class is somehow more deserving of protection than other groups who may
experience less visible or debilitating impairments. For a discussion of the notion that disabled
people must work to "deserve" protection from disability discrimination, see supra notes 37-39 and
accompanying text.
139. See United States v. Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1081 (W.D. Wis.
1998) (deciding to disregard "the alphabet soup of medication responsible for stabilizing [the HIV-
infected plaintiffs] T cell count" because it "has no proven long term effectiveness and may
become useless if a resistant form of the virus develops").
140. See Schluter v. Indus. Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (taking
account of plaintiffs use of insulin to control diabetes); see also Maureen R. Walsh, Note, Wat
Constitutes a "Disability' Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: Should Courts Consider
Mitigating Measures?, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 917, 948-54 (1998) (advocating a similar multi-
factor test that would take account of the reliability and effectiveness of a given mitigating
measure).
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B. The "Record of" Prong
If a court were to adopt a strict reading of the "actual disability" prong
and hold that it does not cover a plaintiff whose otherwise substantially
limiting impairment is presently controlled through medication or other
means, one would assume that the plaintiff would still qualify as disabled
under the "record of" prong. After all, this second prong of the definition
was meant to protect individuals who have been diagnosed with serious
impairments but no longer suffer from their full effects."' However, many
plaintiffs with progressive impairments are able to receive treatments or
corrective devices before their impairments reach the substantially limiting
stage. 42 The "record of" prong will not reach these individuals because
there would have been no time in the past when they were actually
substantially limited, as that term has been narrowly construed.'43 Thus,
many plaintiffs who would not qualify as "disabled" under the "actual
disability" prong-if that prong is read to take account of mitigating
measures-will similarly not qualify under the "record of" prong. Under
those circumstances, coverage under the second prong will depend, rather
arbitrarily, on whether the impairment had progressed to the "substantially
limiting" stage before mitigating measures began to take effect.
C. The "Regarded As" Prong
Some commentators have opined that if courts interpret the "actual
disability" prong to take account of mitigating measures, then many plaintiffs
who suffer discrimination due to controlled or treated impairments will still
qualify for statutory protection under the "regarded as" prong.' 44  For
example, a plaintiff whose epilepsy is controlled through medication may still
141. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52-53 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 334-35; H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
452.
142. Cancer patients who receive timely diagnoses, for example, may undergo radiation or
chemotherapy before their disease progresses to the point of substantially limiting their activities.
143. See, e.g., Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that plaintiff with breast cancer did not have record of disability where plaintiff's cancer treatment
allowed her to continue to perform her job on a modified schedule before her discharge).
144. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 74, at 597 ("Where the employer discriminates against an
employee because of potential limitations of the employee's unmedicated condition, the employee is
protected under the third prong of the definition . . . ."); Puma, supra note 128, at 147 (arguing
that an approach that accounts for mitigating measures "would not leave impaired individuals
entirely unprotected if a true injustice were to occur. The ADA still would protect individuals
under the 'regarded as' prong of the Act if they proved that their employer 'regarded' their non-
disabling impairment as a disability and discriminated against them on that basis.").
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suffer discrimination from an employer who fears the disease out of
ignorance. Even if courts were to take the medication into account and hold
that the "actual disability" prong does not cover such a plaintiff, this
individual would appear to have suffered discrimination due to "myths, fears
and stereotypes," and thus to have qualified as disabled under the third prong
of the test. 45 However, because the courts have generally construed the
"regarded as" prong literally,' this plaintiff will have to show that her
employer actually believed that her epilepsy substantially limited her in some
major life activity."
In this case, the employer may not have done so; it may simply have
feared epilepsy for baseless, vague reasons and did not wish to have someone
with epilepsy working in its midst. For such a plaintiff, no "major life
activity" easily suggests itself around which to base a "regarded as"
argument. The employer has not necessarily regarded the plaintiff's epilepsy
as substantially limiting her in walking, seeing, breathing, or any other major
life activity. In this case, the plaintiff would probably be forced to fall back
on the major life activity of working, arguing that her employer viewed her
as substantially limited in this area. However, this argument would very
likely fall victim to the one-job-is-not-enough rule. 4 8 The employer, in
fearing epilepsy and stereotyping those who suffer from it, is not necessarily
implying that someone with epilepsy is substantially limited in working in a
broad class of jobs; the employer instead is simply choosing not to hire
someone with epilepsy for one specific position. Thus, although Congress
appears to have intended the ADA to cover this victim of discrimination,'49
she would likely have no recourse under the statute, unless a court
interpreted the "actual disability" prong by disregarding the epilepsy
medication in the first place.
145. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
147. Further, a court that takes account of mitigating measures under the "actual disability"
prong would presumably also do so under the "regarded as" prong. Thus, under the "regarded as"
prong, a plaintiff appearing before such a court would have to show that her employer, even while
considering the effects of her epilepsy medication, still believed her to be substantially limited in
some major life activity. The Tenth Circuit followed this pattern in Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (1997), aff'd, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999), which involved plaintiffs with severe
myopia. After taking account of the plaintiffs' corrective lenses in the "actual disability" analysis,
the court discussed the "regarded as" prong in terms of the defendant airline's view that the
plaintiffs could perform many other piloting jobs. Id. at 905-06. Apparently, the airline's view
presumed that the plaintiffs would wear their lenses while performing these other jobs. As a result,
the court concluded that the airline had not regarded the plaintiffs as being substantially limited in
working. Id. at 906.
148. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 10.
31:1071 1097
1098 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J.
Another type of discrimination that falls through the cracks under a literal
interpretation of the ADA's disability definition is discrimination based on a
mitigating measure itself. Arlene Mayerson, for example, describes a case
in which she represented a plaintiff who wore a hearing aid.' 50 Although the
defendant-employer admitted that "the reason the plaintiff was not hired was
because he wore a hearing aid,"' the court dismissed the case on summary
judgment, apparently finding that the plaintiffs hearing aid prevented him
from being substantially limited under the disability definition's first prong,
and also finding that the employer had not regarded the plaintiff as being
substantially limited under the "regarded as" prong.'52 One can easily
envision similar results in cases brought by plaintiffs using prostheses, leg
braces, voice simulators, and other highly visible mitigating measures, even
though such people are among the individuals whom proponents of the plain
language approach would classify as the "truly disabled." These people are
among those whom the ADA was unquestionably meant to protect. 153
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S RECENT NARROWING OF THE ADA'S SCOPE
WITH RESPECT TO PLAINTIFFS WHO EMPLOY MITIGATING MEASURES: THE
SUTTON-MURPHY-KIRKINGBURG TRIO
On June 22, 1999, the United States Supreme Court handed down
decisions in three cases raising the issue of whether mitigating measures
should factor into the determination of whether an ADA plaintiffs
impairment "substantially limits" him or her in a major life activity and thus
constitutes a disability.' 54 The Court used the occasion to question the
validity of EEOC regulations defining disability5 5 and, in each case, held
unequivocally that the plaintiffs' abilities to reduce the impact of their
impairments through corrective lenses, medication, or subconscious
compensating mechanisms prevented them from being "substantially
limited. "
56
150. See Mayerson, supra note 114, at 592-93.
151. Id. at 593.
152. See id. at 592-93.
153. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
154. The three cases were: Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999); Murphy
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999); and Albertsons, Inc., v. Kirkingburg, 119 S.
Ct. 2162 (1999).
155. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
156. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149; Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137; Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at
2168-69.
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A. Sutton v. United Air Lines
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, the United States Supreme Court held
unambiguously that if an ADA plaintiff "is taking measures to correct for, or
mitigate, a physical or mental impairment, the effects of those measures-
both positive and negative-must be taken into account when judging
whether that person is 'substantially limited' in a major life activity and thus
'disabled' under the Act."' 57 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote for a
majority of seven justices, while Justices Stevens and Breyer each filed
strong dissents.
The Sutton plaintiffs, Karen Sutton and Kimberly Hinton, were twin
sisters who had worked as regional airline pilots and applied for jobs as
global pilots with United Air Lines ("United")."" Each plaintiff had "20/200
vision or worse in her right eye and 20/400 vision or worse in her left eye,"
but each had 20/20 vision or better when wearing corrective lenses." 9 After
they applied for the global pilot jobs, United informed the plaintiffs that they
did not meet United's minimum vision standard, which required uncorrected
vision of 20/100 or better.' 6°  United therefore declined to offer either
plaintiff a job as a global pilot.'
6'
The plaintiffs brought suit under the ADA in the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado. 62 The district court dismissed the suit,
holding that the plaintiffs had not met the threshold requirement of alleging a
"disability" under the ADA. First, they could not meet the "actual
disability" prong of the definition because they could fully correct their
visual impairments with glasses or contact lenses. 163 In addition, the court
held that they could not meet the "regarded as" prong of the ADA's
disability definition because United did not view the plaintiffs as substantially
limited in any major life activity, including working."6 United did not view
the sisters as limited in working, the court explained, because United did not
believe that their visual impairments foreclosed generally the type of
employment involved. Instead, United merely viewed them as unacceptable
candidates for one specific job-that of a global airline pilot. 6 The Tenth
157. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.




162. See generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917
(D. Colo. Aug. 28, 1996), aff'd, 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997), aff'd, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
163. See id. at *3.
164. See id. at *5-6.
165. See id. at *6.
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Circuit upheld the district court's interpretations of both the "actual" and
"regarded as" prongs of the ADA disability definition and therefore affirmed
the dismissal. "
In affirming the Tenth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court majority
employed a plain language approach, parsing the text of the disability
definition with a high degree of literalism and ignoring other potential
interpretive sources such as legislative history and agency regulations and
guidelines. Indeed, with respect to the EEOC regulations interpreting the
definition, Justice O'Connor's decision went so far as to state that "no
agency has been delegated authority to interpret the term 'disability.""
'167
However, because the parties in Sutton had agreed to "accept the regulations
as valid," the Court found that it had "no occasion to consider what
deference they are due, if any. "168
As it examined the language of the ADA, the Court found that the first
prong of the Act's disability definition could reasonably apply only to a
limitation that "actually and presently" exists, and not to a limitation that has
been corrected through mitigating measures. 69 In explaining this conclusion,
the Court placed great weight upon the fact that the words "substantially
limits" appear in the definition in the "present indicative verb form."
70
Thus, the Court reasoned, "[a] 'disability' exists only where an impairment
'substantially limits' a major life activity, not where it 'might,' 'could,' or
'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken. "'7
In addition, the Court emphasized that the "actual disability" prong of the
definition requires courts to evaluate the presence of a disability "with
respect to an individual" and to determine whether a given impairment
substantially limits the "major life activities of such individual." 72 Ignoring
mitigating measures in the disability analysis would run "counter to the
individualized inquiry mandated by the ADA," the Court reasoned, because
it would require speculation regarding the typical effect that an uncorrected
166. See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 906.
167. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145. The Court supported this conclusion by noting that the Act
itself delegates to certain agencies the authority to interpret only Titles I-IV of the ADA and that the
disability definition, being part of the Act's general provisions, falls outside of these specific titles.
See id. at 2144-45. For an explanation of the ADA's grants of regulatory authority to the EEOC
and the DOJ, see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
168. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145.
169. Id. at 2146.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2147 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994)).
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impairment would have on people in general.' Instead, the Court held that
the disability analysis must focus on "the individual's actual condition." 74
Finally, the Court relied heavily on the Findings section at the beginning
of the ADA, which notes that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or
more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the
population as a whole is growing older."' 75 The Court traced this figure to a
number of federal agency reports that appeared to have estimated the
disabled population by counting only those people with uncorrected
impairments.' 76 "Because it is included in the ADA's text," O'Connor
wrote, "the finding that 43 million individuals are disabled gives content to
the ADA's terms, specifically the term 'disability. '"" 77 She went on to note
that "[h]ad Congress intended to include all persons with corrected physical
limitations among those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited
a much higher number. "17' Applying its narrow interpretation of the "actual
disability" prong to the twin plaintiffs in Sutton, the Court found them to
have no actual disabilities because they experienced no limitations when
wearing corrective lenses and they had conceded that the wearing of the
lenses was not in itself substantially limiting.1
79
As for the "regarded as" prong of the definition, the Court viewed the
statutory text in a similarly literal manner. The plaintiffs had argued that
United had regarded them as substantially limited in the major life activity of
working because it had found them unfit to be global pilots due to their
visual impairments."' ° Specifically, they had contended that United's vision
173. Id. at 2147.
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. See id. at 2147-49.
177. Id. at 2149.
178. Id. This point struck Justice Ginsburg in particular; she wrote in a brief concurrence that
the "43 million" figure was one of the "strongest clues" to Congress's intentions as to the ADA's
scope. Id. at 2152 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Two other findings provided her with equally
strong clues: that "individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority," and that they
have been "subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of
political powerlessness in our society." Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(7) (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[Plersons whose uncorrected eyesight is
poor, or who rely on daily medication for their well-being, can be found in every social and
economic class; they do not cluster among the politically powerless, nor do they coalesce as
historical victims of discrimination." Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
179. See id. at 2149.
180. See id. at 2150. The plaintiffs did not attempt to argue that they were regarded as
substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing. They probably rejected this avenue because
the "regarded as" argument would be necessary only if the Court held that they were not "actually"
limited in seeing because of their glasses or contact lenses. Once the Court adopted the idea of
taking account of corrective measures, it presumably would apply similar reasoning to the
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requirement was unnecessarily restrictive because it was based on precisely
the type of "myth and stereotype" that the "regarded as" prong was meant to
guard against.' However, the Court ignored the "myth and stereotype"
argument and interpreted the "regarded as" prong solely in light of the
"general foreclosure" rule of Forrisi v. Bowen,"8 holding that "[t]o be
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, . . . one must be
precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular
job of choice."' 83 Because the Court found that the plaintiffs were limited in
performing only the "single job" of "global airline pilot," it held that United
had not regarded them as being substantially limited in working. i" The
Court further found it irrelevant that large numbers of other airlines might
similarly find the plaintiffs unsuited for such a job: "[a]n otherwise valid job
requirement, such as a height requirement, does not become invalid simply
because it would limit a person's employment opportunities in a substantial
way if it were adopted by a substantial number of employers. " " Thus,
according to the Court, the plaintiffs would not be substantially limited in
working even if every airline disqualified them from being global pilots,
because the plaintiffs could still find other jobs that required their skills, such
as regional pilot and pilot instructor positions.' 
8 6
"regarded as" prong and hold that United did not view them as substantially limited in seeing
because United knew that they could function normally while wearing lenses. Thus, the stronger
argument on the "regarded as" issue would focus on working as a pilot rather than seeing; United
clearly did see them as limited in working as pilots-at least as United global airlines pilots.
181. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) app. (1999) (explaining that the "regarded as" prong
covers an individual who is "rejected from a job because of 'myths, fears and stereotypes'
associated with disabilities").
182. 794 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1986); see also supra note 113.
183. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151. In discussing this issue, the Court revealed in dicta that it
may some day find occasion to invalidate "working" as a major life activity under the ADA
altogether: "[because the parties accept that the term 'major life activities' includes working, we do
not determine the validity of the [EEOC regulations describing working as a major life activity].
We note, however, that there may be some difficulty in defining 'major life activities' to include
work." Id.; see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.20)(3)(i), (ii)(A) (1999). This difficulty, according to the
Court, stems from a perceived circularity in arguments based upon working. If an employer
prohibits an employee from working because the employee has some type of impairment that may
not otherwise be substantially limiting, the Court fears that then the employee may ratchet the
impairment up to the "substantially limiting" level by arguing that it substantially limits him in the
major life activity of working because of the employer's decision. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2152. The majority never explained how to determine whether a job requirement
based upon a physical impairment, such as the vision requirement at issue in Sutton, is "otherwise
valid." Indeed, the Court's holding on the disability issue in Sutton had the practical effect of
relieving United of the burden of showing that its vision requirement was valid in the first place.
186. See id. at 2151-52.
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A passionate dissent by Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, accused
the majority of "legislative myopia" in its dismissal of the visually impaired
plaintiffs' claims. 87  Relying on legislative history, Stevens concluded that
Congress surely intended to include at least some correctable impairments
within the ADA's disability definition. 88 Given the "remedial purpose" of
the ADA' 89 and the relevant agencies' expansive interpretations of the
disability definition,'" ° Stevens did not see the limiting language in the Act's
Findings sections' 9' as controlling on the issue of whether mitigated
impairments should count as disabilities under the statute."' 2 He further
found it "especially ironic to deny protection for persons with substantially
limiting impairments that, when corrected, render them fully able and
employable." 9 3 Writing separately in dissent, Justice Breyer found that the
rather unworkable language of the statutory definition left the Court with two
imperfect choices:
We must draw a statutory line that either (1) will include
within the category of persons authorized to bring suit under the
[ADA] some whom Congress may not have wanted to protect
(those who wear ordinary eyeglasses), or (2) will exclude from the
threshold category those whom Congress certainly did want to
protect (those who successfully use corrective devices or
medicines, such as hearing aids or prostheses or medicine for
epilepsy). 194
Given the "statute's language, structure, basic purposes, and history,"
Breyer believed that the Court was required to choose the former option.' 95
He added that although the majority had questioned the EEOC's authority to
issue regulations elaborating upon the statute's "disability" definition, 96 the
agency indeed had this authority, given that the word "disability" appears in
187. Id. at 2152 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. See id. at 2155 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334; H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3 at 28 (1990),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989)).
189. Id. at 2152 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. See id. at 2155-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. See id. at 2155 (Stevens, ., dissenting); see also supra notes 175-78 and accompanying
text (discussing the majority's emphasis upon the legislative findings that only 43 million Americans
have disabilities and that people with disabilities are a "discrete and insular minority").
192. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2156 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 2159 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
195. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 2161-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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the text of the subchapter over which the EEOC has specific regulatory
power."
B. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
Decided on the same day as Sutton, Murphy v. United Parcel Service,
Inc.,"98 allowed the Court an opportunity to elaborate upon its holding in
Sutton. Specifically, the Court expanded upon the notion that for purposes
of the ADA's disability definition, courts should consider plaintiffs'
impairments with reference to any mitigating measures that the plaintiffs
employ.' The Murphy case arose after United Parcel Service ("UPS")
dismissed a mechanic, Vaughn Murphy, from his job because of his high
blood pressure.2 Murphy's blood pressure, when he was not on
medication, was approximately 250/160.21 However, when he took
medication, he could "function normally" but for an inability to lift heavy
objects. 2' When UPS hired Murphy, his medicated blood pressure was
measured at 186/124.0
Because UPS required its mechanics to drive commercial motor vehicles,
it also required them to satisfy certain health requirements imposed by the
Department of Transportation ("DOT") upon the drivers of such vehicles. 2'
These requirements included a provision that drivers not have diagnosed high
blood pressure that would be likely to interfere with the ability to operate a
commercial vehicle safely. 5 Murphy was at first erroneously granted DOT
health certification, but UPS asked him to be retested when the error was
discovered.' °6 Although the retesting resulted in two slightly lower blood
pressure readings, 7 they were still not low enough to qualify Murphy for
the standard one-year DOT certification. 208  The lower readings did,
197. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2161-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The majority labeled this
reasoning an "imaginative" interpretation of the statutory delegation provisions. Id. at 2145.
Nevertheless, the EEOC's power to elaborate upon the statutory definition of disability had not been
questioned in any of the previous circuit court decisions raising the mitigating measures issue. For
a list of these cases, see supra note 120.
198. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
199. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
200. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 2137.
203. See id. at 2136.
204. See id. at 2136-37.
205. See id. at 2136 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(a) (1998)).
206. See id.
207. The retesting resulted in readings of 160/102 and 164/104. See id.
208. See id. at 2138.
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however, qualify him for an optional temporary DOT health certification. 20 9
Nevertheless, UPS never allowed Murphy to attempt to obtain the temporary
certification because it dismissed him immediately after the retesting,
believing that he could not meet the DOT requirements.2 0
Murphy brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas, alleging disability discrimination under Title I of the ADA.21
Ruling that Murphy's high blood pressure should be evaluated "in its
medicated state," the district court held that he did not meet the "actual
disability" prong of the ADA's definition. 22 The court further held that UPS
did not regard Murphy as disabled merely by viewing him as uncertifiable
under the DOT regulations. 23 Therefore, the district court granted summary
judgment to UPS. 214 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment.
215
Applying its rule regarding mitigating measures from Sutton, the United
States Supreme Court quickly concluded that Murphy did not meet the
ADA's "actual disability" prong, given that Murphy had not alleged that he
was substantially limited in any major life activity when medicated.21 6
Writing for the same seven-justice majority that decided Sutton, Justice
O'Connor noted that the case was "clear" on this issue. 217 Addressing the
"regarded as" issue, the Court applied the same "general foreclosure" rule
that it had applied in Sutton and concluded that Murphy had not been
regarded as substantially limited in working.21 a Instead, Murphy's evidence
showed only that UPS had regarded him as being unable to perform a single
mechanic job that required the driving of commercial vehicles. 219 Thus, like
the case of the twin pilots in Sutton, Murphy's case on the "regarded as"
issue fell victim to the one-job-is-not-enough rule.'
209. See id.
210. See id. at 2136, 2138.
211. See id. at 2136.
212. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 881-82 (D. Kan. 1996), aff'd,
141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998), aff'd, 119 S. Ct. 790 (1999).
213. See id. at 882.
214. See id. at 884.
215. See 141 F.3d 1185 (1999) (unpublished table decision).
216. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137. The Court, however, indicated that a plaintiff could
potentially meet this test if he or she continued to experience substantial limitations despite
medication, or experienced such limitations as side effects from medication. See id.
217. Id. at 2137.
218. See id. at 2139.
219. See id. at 2138. Indeed, the Court noted that Murphy had secured another mechanic job,
which did not require driving, shortly after UPS dismissed him. See id. at 2139.
220. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text (describing the one-job-is-not-enough
rule).
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As he had in Sutton, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, registered
a strong dissent.22 Citing his dissent in Sutton, Stevens wrote that Murphy's
hypertension should be evaluated in its unmedicated state and added that
without medication, Murphy "would likely be hospitalized."222 He believed
that Murphy's case presented an easier question than had Sutton because
"this case scarcely requires us to speculate whether Congress intended the
Act to cover individuals with [severe hypertension]. "223
C. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg
The final case in the Supreme Court's trio of mitigating measures
decisions was Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,' which concerned a truck
driver with a visual impairment.2' Hallie Kirkingburg began to work as a
driver for Albertsons, Inc. ("Albertsons"), a supermarket chain, in 1990.226
An uncorrectable vision condition had left him with 20/200 vision in his left
eye, effectively causing him to have monocular vision.' Despite this
problem, Kirkingburg could drive and perform other tasks by making
"subconscious adjustments to the manner in which he sensed depth and
perceived peripheral objects."228  In 1990, a doctor erroneously certified
Kirkingburg as meeting the basic vision standards of the Department of
Transportation ("DOT"), and Albertsons hired him.229 The following year,
during a required physical, another doctor discovered the original error and
informed Kirkingburg that he did not meet the basic standards but that he
could apply for a waiver through the DOT. 230 Kirkingburg did so, but before
he received his waiver, Albertsons fired him for failing to meet the basic
DOT standardsY.2' In 1993, Kirkingburg applied with his waiver to
Albertsons, but the company refused to rehire him.232
221. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2139 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
225. See id. at 2165-66.
226. See id. at 2165.
227. See id. at 2165-66.
228. Kirkingburg v. Albertsons, Inc., 143 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 119 S. Ct.
2162 (1999).
229. See Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2166.
230. See id. To receive a vision waiver under the DOT's rules, an applicant needed three
years of recent commercial driving experience with a clean record and had to agree to an annual
vision check. See id. (citing Qualification of Drivers; Vision Waiver, 57 Fed. Reg. 31,458,
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Kirkingburg brought suit under the ADA in the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon.233 Albertsons won in the district court on
summary judgment, having argued that Kirkingburg was not "qualified" for
the driving position because of his failure to meet the basic DOT
standards.2" After Kirkingburg appealed to the Ninth Circuit, Albertsons
argued for the first time that, in addition to being unqualified, Kirkingburg
was not disabled under the ADA. 5 The Ninth Circuit held that Kirkingburg
was indeed disabled, despite his ability to drive and perform other daily
tasks, because "the manner in which he sees differs significantly from the
manner in which most people see. 236 Holding in addition that Kirkingburg
was not unqualified as a matter of law, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's granting of summary judgment. 
237
The Supreme Court granted certorari on both the "disabled" and
"qualified" issues.238 With respect to whether Kirkingburg was disabled, the
Court held that he had failed to present evidence that his monocular vision
substantially limited him in any major life activities."' Writing for a seven-
justice majority, 24 Justice Souter wrote that the Ninth Circuit mistakenly
equated a difference in the "'major life activity of seeing"' with a substantial
limitation.24' The fact that Kirkingburg used his eyes differently than most
people did not, in itself, render him substantially limited in the major life
activity of seeing.242 More significantly, the Court held that Kirkingburg's
ability to compensate for his monocular vision through subconscious
mechanisms should have been taken into account in the determination of
whether his visual impairment substantially limited him.243 Citing the
Court's holding in Sutton, Souter wrote that "[w]e see no principled basis for
distinguishing between measures undertaken with artificial aids, like
medications and devices, and measures undertaken, whether consciously or
not, with the body's own systems. " 244 Assessing Kirkingburg's impairment
on an individualized basis, the Court held that he had failed to raise a fact
233. See Kirkingburg, 143 F.3d at 1230-31.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 1232.
236. Id. (emphasis added).
237. See id. at 1237.
238. See Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2167, 2169 (1999).
239. See id. at 2168-69.
240. Justices Stevens and Breyer disagreed with the majority on the disability issue, as they
had in Sutton and Murphy. See Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2165 n.* (noting that Justices Stevens
and Breyer did not join Part II of the majority's opinion).
241. See Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2168 (quoting Kirkingburg, 143 F.3d at 1232).
242. See id.
243. See id. at 2169.
244. Id.
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issue regarding whether he had a substantial limitation in seeing, and thus a
disability, because no evidence indicated that Kirkingburg's monocular vision
placed any significant restrictions upon his activities. 45 The Court also held
that Kirkingburg's inability to meet the basic DOT vision standards rendered
him unqualified for the driving job with Albertsons, and it therefore reversed
the Ninth Circuit's decision.2u
VI. PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL FLAWS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
MITIGATING MEASURES DECISIONS
A. Problems with the Court's Interpretation of the "Actual Disability" Prong
in the Context of Mitigating Measures
The Court's decision to take into account a plaintiff's use of mitigating
measures when assessing whether the plaintiff's impairment substantially
limits a major life activity and thus constitutes a disability for ADA purposes
is flawed in several respects. First, and most importantly, the holding
imposes a "plain meaning" analysis upon statutory language that is far from
plain. The mere fact that so many lower courts247 have differed over the
meaning of the words "substantially limits a major life activity" with respect
to impairments treated with mitigating measures indicates that the
terminology lacks a single plain meaning. In light of the ambiguity of the
first prong of the disability definition in this context, the Court should have
looked to legislative history to determine the legislative intent behind the
provision. Granted, legislative history is an imperfect means of determining
legislative intent,' but it offers the best available insight when statutory
245. See id. The Court noted, however, that people with monocular vision would "ordinarily"
meet the disability definition because many of them cannot compensate adequately for their degree
of impairment. Id. Nevertheless, all ADA plaintiffs, including those with monocular vision, must
.prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation in terms of their own
experience, as in loss of depth perception and visual field, is substantial." Id.
246. See id. at 2174.
247. For a discussion of the split in prior authority on this issue, see supra notes 130-31 and
accompanying text.
248. Statutes are products not of a "single mind," but rather of a legislature, "whose
numerous members may have divergent objectives." RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE
239 (1998). Therefore, the reports and other documents that constitute a statute's legislative history
may never account for all of the various intentions behind its passage.
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language is less than clear. 249 The legislative history regarding mitigating
measures indicates that the "disability" assessment should disregard such
measures and focus instead on the impairment itself."5 This intent is further
reflected in the statutory language because the ADA requires courts to
interpret its text no more narrowly than they had the Rehabilitation Act. 251
Given that when the ADA was passed, the weight of authority interpreting
the identical language of the Rehabilitation Act held that courts should
disregard mitigating measures, 2  it would appear that the ADA was never
meant to support a more restrictive interpretation.
Further, the Court's holdings fail to give adequate deference to agency
interpretations regarding the mitigating measures issue. Surprisingly, the
Court found that "[n]o agency . . . has been given authority to issue
regulations implementing the generally applicable provisions of the ADA,"253
which include the disability definition. This finding upsets years of prior
caselaw, which had relied upon regulatory interpretation of the disability
definition in both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. 4  Turning to the
specific EEOC interpretive guidance concerning mitigating measures, the
Court found the guidance irrelevant because the plain language of the ADA
itself answered the issue unambiguously. 25 As noted above, however, the
pertinent ADA language is far from unambiguous.256 Given the ambiguity,
resort to agency guidance is appropriate.257  In addition, given the
249. See Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 382-
83 (discussing the necessity of resorting to legislative history when statutory language fails to
convey congressional intent unambiguously).
250. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
253. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2145 (1999).
254. The Court later noted that because the parties agreed as to the validity of the EEOC
regulations defining "disability," it had no occasion to consider what degree of deference the
regulations deserved. See id. Nevertheless, its prior statement that "no agency" has authority to
issue such regulations stakes out a rather clear position on the issue, and a very unexpected one.
Under the Rehabilitation Act, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and later the
DOJ, had issued detailed regulatory and interpretive guidance regarding the disability definition.
See SCOTCH, supra note 38, at 121-30 (chronicling the promulgation of the HEW regulations and
the transfer of regulatory authority to the DOJ in 1980). There appears to be no case questioning
these agencies' authority to do so. Indeed, Congress relied upon these existing regulations in
drafting the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994) (stating that the ADA should be construed
using standards at least as broad as those applied in "the regulations issued by Federal agencies"
pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act). Moreover, no prior ADA decision had
questioned the EEOC's general authority to interpret the statute's disability definition.
255. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47.
256. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
257. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984) ("[lf the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question
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overwhelming evidence in the legislative history that Congress indeed
intended courts to disregard mitigating measures in the disability analysis, 8
and the fact that the EEOC promulgated its interpretive guidance pursuant to
formal rulemaking procedures,"s9 the guidance was entitled to a high degree
of deference.2" The Court's refusal to grant such deference is consistent
with a general and inappropriate lack of respect shown to the EEOC
throughout the federal court system.26'
Further, the Court's attitude regarding agency interpretation of the
"disability" definition contradicts its own precedent from only a year earlier.
In Bragdon v. Abbott,262 the Court had noted that DOJ regulations
elaborating upon the "disability" definition were "entitled to deference,"
263
despite the fact that the DOJ, like the EEOC, had received regulatory
authority over only a specific substantive title of the ADA rather than over
the general definitional sections. 2' 4 The refusal of the Sutton Court to follow
such recent precedent indeed reinforces the idea that the EEOC is wrongly
receiving second-class treatment at the hands of the courts.265
Further, the Court's interpretation of the "actual disability" prong leaves
open an important question: whether the disability definition will cover
for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.").
An agency's construction will be permissible so long as it represents "a reasonable interpretation."
Id. at 844.
258. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
259. On February 28, 1991, the EEOC published its proposed regulations and interpretive
guidance, pursuant to Congress's grant of authority to promulgate regulations to implement Title I
of the ADA. See Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disability, 56 Fed.
Reg. 8,578, 8,578 (1991) (to be codified as an appendix to 29 C.F.R. § 1630) (proposed Feb. 28,
1991). The proposed regulations contained the full text of the interpretive guidance appendix,
including the "mitigating measures" guideline. See id. at 8,592-93. When the EEOC published its
final rules and interpretive guidance on July 26, 1991, the interpretive guidance requiring
assessment without mitigating measures was essentially unchanged. See Equal Employment
Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726, 35,727 (1991) (subsequently
codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (app. § 1630)).
260. For a general discussion regarding the degree of deference due to EEOC regulations
under the ADA, see Colker, supra note 3, at 133-37. For a specific discussion of the deference due
the "mitigating measures" guideline, see id. at 153-56 (arguing that the guideline deserves a high
level of deference due to the statutory ambiguity, the legislative history, and the EEOC's
compliance with the formal rulemaking process in issuing the guideline).
261. See id. at 144 ("Instead of considering how much deference Congress intended to be
accorded to the EEOC under the ADA, the lower courts appear to have reflexively assessed the
views of the EEOC in light of the second-class status accorded the EEOC under Title VII and the
[Age Discrimination in Employment Act].").
262. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
263. Id. at 646.
264. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (1994) (granting authority to the DOJ regarding Title III of the
ADA).
265. See Colker, supra note 3, at 144.
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plaintiffs who do not use available mitigating measures to combat the
substantially limiting effects of their impairments. This issue will
undoubtedly arise in the future, as there are many individuals who, for
reasons of finances, religious beliefs, or personal aversions, may find
themselves unable to take advantage of treatments that may curb the effects
of impairments from which they suffer. Some guidance on this issue may be
inferred from Sutton: if courts are to adhere strictly to the "present
indicative" form of the words "substantially limits," and are to inquire
whether a plaintiff is "presently-not potentially or hypothetically-
substantially limited, 2 66 then it would seem that plaintiffs opting not to use
mitigating measures will be deemed disabled, while others who suffer
identical impairments but opt for treatment will not. This approach is at best
counterintuitive because it denies protection against disability discrimination
to plaintiffs simply because they have taken active steps to counteract the
difficulties imposed by their impairments.
The Court's refusal to follow the EEOC's guidance regarding mitigating
measures is problematic for an additional reason: it tends to shift the focus of
the disability analysis from the "substantially limits" element to the "major
life activity" element, which has historically been subject to wildly varying
interpretations.267 For example, a plaintiff with HIV may still qualify as
"disabled" under the ADA even if she follows a course of medication that
suppresses symptoms of the disease, because she may still be substantially
limited in the major life activity of "reproduction," given the chance that she
would pass the disease along to her child.268 However, another plaintiff with
an equally serious disease would be held not disabled if her therapy was
equally successful, but her disease did not happen to affect the reproductive
process or any other process that a court is willing to call "major."269
The Sutton Court justifies its holding in part by noting that the EEOC
guideline, in instructing courts to ignore the effects of mitigating measures,
266. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146 (1999).
267. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
268. In Bragdon v. Abbott, a woman with asymptomatic HIV was held to be substantially
limited in the major life activity of reproduction, in part because even with antiretroviral therapy,
she would stand an eight percent chance of infecting her child'. See 524 U.S. 624, 640 (1998).
269. Indeed, even a woman with HIV might not be considered disabled if she were past child-
bearing age and thus not personally limited in reproduction by her disease. In any case, the major
life activity element injects the disability analysis with a certain degree of arbitrariness and shifts its
focus away from the underlying purpose of the ADA-to prevent impairment-based prejudices from
denying opportunities to disabled people. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. For a
criticism of Bragdon's interpretation of the major life activity element, see Christiana M. Ajalat, Is
HIV Really a 'Disability"?: The Scope of the Americans with Disabilities Act After Bragdon v.
Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 751,763-64 (1999).
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would prevent courts from considering any substantially limiting side effects
resulting from the use of such measures. 270 However, the Court's concern
for individuals who suffer severe side effects is misplaced. Presumably,
individuals suffering severe side effects from treatment are doing so because
they would be experiencing even more serious effects without treatment.
27 1
Thus, these individuals would be covered under the EEOC's interpretation of
the actual disability prong in any case.
Overall, the Court's interpretation of the "actual disability" prong rests
upon unsound policy that is inconsistent with the ADA's efforts to combat
disability discrimination in the first place. By severely restricting the class of
individuals covered by the statute, the Court emphasizes the minority group
theory of disability, 2 2 indicating that only a relatively narrow group of
citizens is entitled to freedom from disability-based discrimination. Granted,
the statute itself creates a protected class and thus necessitates judicial
decisions regarding whether plaintiffs fall inside or outside of it, but the
ADA's remedial nature necessitates a broad interpretation of this class.273
The Court, however, uses the definition to further a narrow, charity-based
model of disability, affording rights only to those who "deserve" them by
virtue of sufficient suffering. 274  The majority opinion places great emphasis
upon the findings that are incorporated as a preamble to the ADA and
specifically upon the finding that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or
more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the
270. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
271. See id. at 2159 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Miost individuals who take medication that
itself substantially limits a major life activity would be substantially limited in some other way if
they did not take the medication.").
272. For a discussion of the minority group theory, see supra notes 41-43 and accompanying
text. This theory, to a small extent, is reflected in the ADA's statutory finding that individuals with
disabilities are a "discrete and insular minority." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994). However, it is
belied by the flexible, open-ended three-pronged disability definition, which covers people with a
"record of" certain impairments, and even those who are merely "regarded as" having certain
impairments. Id. § 12102(2).
273. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (noting that remedial
legislation should be interpreted broadly to effectuate its underlying purposes); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(b)(1) (1994) (explaining that the purpose behind the ADA is to provide a "comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination" of disability-based discrimination).
274. This model of the deserving sufferer is popular among the media, which sometimes
profess outrage that undeserving people who are not suffering from sufficiently terrible mental and
physical impairments would dare to claim protection from discrimination. See, e.g., Bovard, supra
note 1 (discussing various "bogus" claims asserted by employees); Shalit, supra note 1 (criticizing
the ADA's coverage of less severe impairments). Even some academic commentators have framed
arguments in terms of "deserving." See, e.g., Harris, supra note 74, at 575 (criticizing the ADA's
coverage of "undeserving" plaintiffs).
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population as a whole is growing older."2 75 Although the Court also admits
that "the exact source of the forty-three million figure is not clear," 276 it
proceeds to base its interpretation of the "disability" definition upon this
figure, noting that if all persons whose impairments were controlled through
mitigating measures were meant to be included, the figure would have been
much higher.2'
In fact, any numerical estimate of the disabled population is questionable
at best, given that "disability" is a relative concept, and so many different
definitions of the term may be used in surveys.2 78 In the case of the forty-
three million figure, none of the Court's cited sources employed a definition
exactly like the "disability" definition appearing in the Rehabilitation Act and
the ADA.2 79 In addition, the figure does not begin to account for the
additional individuals whom Congress intended to cover under the "record
of' and "regarded as" prongs of the definition. Further, when the Court's
restrictive interpretation of the definition is applied, the number of covered
individuals is likely to fall far below the forty-three million figure because it
will exclude some people who, according to the documents from which the
figure supposedly derived, were specifically included among the forty-three
million reported individuals .2' Given Congress's clear intention to include
at least some individuals whose impairments are controlled through
mitigating measures, 28 1 the inconsistencies surrounding the forty-three million
figure make it a slippery basis indeed for the majority's interpretation of the
"disability" definition.
Further, to the extent that the majority felt the need to restrict the
protected class in order to avoid a potential flood of litigation, it would have
done well to remember that the much wider reach of Title VII's protections
275. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147-49.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 2147-49.
278. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
279. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147-49.
280. The majority writes that the 43 million figure had its roots in a 1986 report by the
National Council on Disability entitled, "Toward Independence." See id. at 2147. However, that
report specifically includes among disabilities hypertension, a controllable condition. See
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE 12 (1986). Further, the majority
cites a Census Bureau report as an additional source of the figure. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2148.
That report similarly lists hypertension and also diabetes, another controllable impairment, as
included disabilities. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF CENSUS, DISABILITY,
FUNCTION LIMITATION, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 1984/5 51 (1986); see also Sutton,
119 S. Ct. at 2160-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting these and other discrepancies and finding an
"inability to make the 43 million figure fit any consistent method of interpreting the word
'disabled'").
281. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing ADA legislative history).
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have not resulted in a debilitating flood.282 Indeed, if a plaintiff's aim were
to file a vexatious or frivolous suit, Title VII's open coverage affords a much
better avenue than the ADA. Moreover, a number of other countries have
promulgated disability discrimination legislation that defines the protected
class in very broad terms,2" and these nations have not suffered debilitating
floods of litigation. Thus, there is no inherent need to restrict the scope of
the ADA to exclude those who control the effects of their impairments
through the use of mitigating measures.
In addition, to the extent that the ADA was intended to fight damaging
stereotypes and prejudices,2" it is illogical to take account of mitigating
measures in the judicial analysis of disability when the relevant
decisionmaker-whether an employer, a public accommodation, or a
government entity-has made allegedly prejudiced judgments based upon the
potential harm posed by the impairment in an unmitigated condition. In
Sutton itself, for example, the plaintiffs were rejected from positions with
United Air Lines, Inc. because they could not meet that employer's
uncorrected vision requirement. This requirement is based upon United's
fear that a pilot's corrective lenses may fail and that the pilot will have to
function in his or her natural, unmitigated state. This fear may or may not
be reasonable; it may or may not be supported by scientific evidence.
However, because the Court, unlike United, is judging the plaintiffs' vision
in a mitigated state, the plaintiffs can never put United to its proof on this
point.2' Thus, the Court's interpretation, which denies individuals with
"mitigated" impairments the right to protection from impairment-based
discrimination, allows employers and other potential defendants the
282. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text (noting that Title VII protects individuals of
all races, genders, national origins, and religions from discrimination on these bases).
283. See COLKER, supra note 101, at 89-99 (describing the broader definitions of "disability"
in anti-discrimination statutes from Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia).
284. The Findings section of the ADA notes that individuals with disabilities have historically
been disadvantaged by "stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of [their] individual ability."
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994).
285. Of course, if the uncorrected vision requirement were shown to be reasonable, the ADA
certainly would not force United to hire anyone who did not meet it. Such a person would not be
.qualified" for the position under the statute and would thus not have a prima facie case of
discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination against only
.qualified" individuals). In addition, United would have an affirmative defense in any case because
a person not meeting the vision requirement would pose a "direct threat." Id. § 12113(b) (1994)
("'[Q]ualification standards' may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.").
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opportunity to establish all manner of impairment-based requirements-
reasonable and unreasonable-without any check whatsoever. 86
B. Problems with the Court's Interpretation of the "Regarded As" Prong
The majority in Sutton notes that even when its narrow interpretation of
the "actual disability" prong excludes a plaintiff using mitigating measures
from ADA coverage, the "regarded as" prong will sometimes allow the
plaintiff to qualify as "disabled" and proceed with his or her discrimination
suit.2" Specifically, the Court states that "one whose high blood pressure is
'cured' by medication may be regarded as disabled by a covered entity, and
thus disabled under subsection C of the definition."2"' One need look no
further than the companion case of Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 289
however, to see that under the Court's equally narrow reading of the
"regarded as" prong, such a scenario will almost never occur in a mitigating
measures case. Vaughn Murphy, who took medication for his hypertension,
did not meet the "regarded as" prong, despite the fact that his employer
admitted to terminating him based on a belief that Murphy's high blood
pressure kept him from obtaining the required health certification, and
despite the fact that this belief may have been erroneous. 29 Once the Court
decided to disregard the potentially severe effects of Murphy's hypertension
in its unmedicated state for purposes of the "actual disability" prong,
Murphy was left with essentially no arguments under the "regarded as"
prong. The defendant may have regarded Murphy as substantially limited in
many major life activities without his medication, but the Court had already
indicated that the "substantially limited" language must be evaluated in terms
286. Individuals affected by unreasonable impairment-based requirements seem to fit the
ADA's description of the "discrete and insular" disabled minority, see 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)
(1994), even though their numbers may make "discrete and insular" a poor choice of words.
According to this description, members of this class are those who have been deprived of power
"based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from
stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the ...ability of such individuals to participate in,
and contribute to, society." Id.
287. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2149 (1999).
288. Id.
289. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
290. See id. at 2136-38. The Court decided that under the "regarded as" prong, it was
irrelevant whether Murphy could have in fact met the requirement for the certification, because that
fact would go "only to whether [Murphy] is qualified and whether respondent has a defense based
on the [Department of Transportation] regulations." Id. at 2138. The Court precluded
consideration of these issues when it decided, as a threshold matter, that Murphy was not disabled
under the "regarded as" prong. See id. at 2139.
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of Murphy's medicated state. 29' Thus, under the "regarded as" prong,
Murphy could argue only that his employer had regarded him as substantially
limited in working, given that it had found him unable to perform his chosen
job due to his supposed inability to obtain the proper health certification.
Predictably, this argument fell victim to the one-job-is-not-enough rule,292 as
the Court ruled that Murphy was still "generally employable as a mechanic"
and thus not substantially limited in working.293
The "regarded as" argument in Sutton failed for similar reasons. Once
the Court had decided that the plaintiffs' vision would be "substantially
limiting" only if it caused them severe problems despite their use of glasses
and contact lenses,2' they were hardly in a position to argue that United, the
defendant, had regarded them as being "substantially limited" in seeing,
given that United knew they could see very well when using corrective
lenses. 295 Thus, they, like Murphy, were backed into a comer and forced to
rely upon a "regarded as substantially limited in working" argument, which
failed for the same reasons that Murphy's argument failed.296
These results contradict the Court's own explanation of the purposes
behind the "regarded as" prong. In Sutton, the Court quotes with approval
guidance from the EEOC noting that the prong is intended to cover
individuals "rejected from a job because of the 'myths, fears and stereotypes'
associated with disabilities. "297 This language would surely cover Vaughn
Murphy, who was rejected from his job based upon the snap judgment that
he could not receive the necessary health certification because of his
hypertension; his employer fired him before he even had a chance to
ascertain his eligibility for the certification. 29' This language could also
291. See id. at 2137.
292. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
293. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2139.
294. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2149 (1999).
295. Mysteriously, the Court claimed that it would have been "obvious" for the plaintiffs to
argue that they had been regarded as "substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing." Id.
at 2150. This comment cannot be viewed as an indication that the Court would have received such
an argument sympathetically, however, because the argument would be based on an interpretation
of the words "substantially limited" that the Court would already have rejected under the "actual
disability" prong. See supra note 180. Rather than failing to assert a strong, obvious argument,
plaintiffs counsel was more likely making a reasonable decision not to waste time, paper, and
breath.
296. The Court held because United had regarded the plaintiffs as being unable to perform
only a single job-global airline pilot-it had not regarded them as substantially limited in working.
See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151.
297. Id. at 2150 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) app. (1999)). The use of the words "a job" in
this context seems to belie the Court's subsequent imposition of the one-job-is-not-enough rule. See
id. at 2151; see also supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
298. See Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136. The Court noted:
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cover the Sutton plaintiffs, who were rejected from a job on the basis of a
vision requirement that was never shown to rest upon reason rather than
randomness. The requirement may have been rational, but, perversely, the
plaintiffs were never allowed to make arguments regarding whether it rested
on myth, fear, or stereotype because they were held not to have been rejected
from a job due to myth, fear, or stereotype.
299
The Sutton majority also quotes School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,
an older Supreme Court Rehabilitation Act decision, to note that the
"regarded as" prong covers "those who are regarded as impaired and who,
as a result, are substantially limited in a major life activity . . . ."'00 This
language emphasizes that the substantial limitation results from the
defendant's view of the plaintiff; it does not mean that the defendant must
view the plaintiff as substantially limited in the first place. This
interpretation is buttressed by the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance regarding
Title I of the ADA, which notes that an individual is "regarded as" disabled
if he or she has "an impairment which is only substantially limiting because
of the attitudes of others toward the impairment." 30' Nevertheless,
contradicting this language, the Sutton majority interprets the "regarded as"
prong more literally to cover only plaintiffs who have an impairment, "real
or imagined, that is regarded as substantially limiting a major life
activity."302 Overall, given this narrow interpretation of the "regarded as"
prong, the one-job-is-not-enough rule, and the Court's decision to take
account of mitigating measures, it is extremely difficult to imagine a case
where a plaintiff who failed the "actual disability" prong due to the
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures would be saved by the "regarded
as" prong. 0 3 Even a person whose employer admits to having fired her due
Had a physician examined [Murphy] and . . . declined to issue a temporary
DOT certification, we would not second-guess that decision. Here, however,
it appears that UPS determined that [Murphy] could not meet the DOT
standards and did not allow him to attempt to obtain the optional temporary
certification.
Id. at 2138.
299. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150-52 (rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that United's vision
requirement was based on myth and stereotype, although not explaining the precise basis for this
rejection).
300. Id. at 2150 (quoting School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987)) (emphasis added).
301. 29 C.F.R. § 1620.2(l)(2), app. (1999). For a discussion of this so-called "attitudinal"
regulation, see supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
302. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150.
303. The author can think only of the following unlikely scenario: a plaintiff would qualify
under the "regarded as" prong, despite having been excluded by the "actual disability" prong, if
her employer mistakenly believed the plaintiffs mitigating measures were not very effective and
thus left her "substantially limited" in some major life activity. This situation is unlikely because if
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to a fear or dislike of her hearing aid would not qualify under the Court's
literal reading of this part of the statute. Nor would a job candidate whose
potential employer tells him, "I don't like people with epilepsy; they're
frightening." Of course, most potential defendants would not make such
damaging admissions openly, but it is instructive to hypothesize that even if
such evidence were available to a plaintiff, it would not help him or her
under the Court's interpretation of the "regarded as" prong.
Finally, even if numerous employers in a given field harbored attitudes
and used restrictions such as those described above, a plaintiff still could not
successfully argue that she was regarded as substantially limited in working
because, to win such an argument, she would have to show that she is
regarded as limited in a broad range of jobs in various classes. 304 The Sutton
plaintiffs, for example, could not persuade the Court that they would be
regarded as substantially limited in working even if a large number of
airlines employed vision requirements similar to those used by United. 0 5 In
responding to and rejecting this argument, the Court noted that "[a]n
otherwise valid job requirement, such as a height requirement, does not
become invalid simply because it would limit a person's employment
opportunities in a substantial way if it were adopted by a substantial number
of employers."30 6  However, this response is based on a false analogy.
Height per se, unlike myopia, is not an impairment. 3' Earlier in its opinion,
the Court itself notes that "an employer is free to decide that physical
characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise to the level of an
the impairment affects a physical or behavioral ability, the employer could presumably judge the
effect of any mitigating measures more or less accurately during a job interview or any other
interaction with the plaintiff. If the employer feared that, despite an apparent ability to function
with mitigating measures, the plaintiff still suffered from some less observable or less frequent ill
effects, those mistakenly feared effects would probably not rise to the level of "substantial"
limitations, due to their subtlety and infrequency.
304. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
305. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2152.
306. Id.
307. Very short stature is the primary and most noticeable characteristic of achondroplastic
dwarfism, which is an impairment. See 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 902.2(c)(5)(i) (Mar.
1995). A person suffering from achondroplastic dwarfism would likely be held disabled, given the
rarity of the disease and given the other physical problems it entails. For a brief overview of
several forms of dwarfism, see Paul Steven Miller, Note, Coming Up Short: Employment
Discrimination Against Little People, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 231, 241 n.53 (1987). Indeed,
even the media would probably class individuals with achondroplastic dwarfism among the "truly
disabled." Such a person would have standing to challenge the validity of an employer's height
requirement under the ADA. Nevertheless, the Court's hypothetical height requirement would
presumably also screen out some individuals who just miss by a few inches one way or the other
and have no impairment at all. Thus, this requirement is very different from a vision requirement,
which screens out only those with vision impairments.
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impairment-such as one's height, build, or singing voice-are preferable to
others."3 8 This observation may be true, but it has little to do with any of
the three mitigating measures cases, all of which involve requirements based
upon physical impairments. 30 9 By implying that United's vision requirement
could be lumped in with the "otherwise valid" requirements involving
height, build, and singing voice, the Court essentially robs the word "valid"
of any meaning in the ADA context. Ironically, with no factual record, the
Court appears to have judged United's vision requirement "valid," even as it
dismissed the plaintiffs' case and thus cut off any inquiry into the validity of
the requirement. Would a department store's unaided hearing requirement
carry similar presumptive validity? What about a factory's requirement that
its employees not need to take breaks to take medication? Indeed, the
Court's finessing of the "validity" issue skips some important analytical steps
and thus leaves the "regarded as" prong vulnerable to being narrowed out of
existence in future cases. Such an interpretation is not only illogical; it also
surely thwarts Congress's intentions in enacting the "regarded as" prong in
the first place.3" °
VII. CONCLUSION
In assessing the disability definition in Sutton and the other mitigating
measures cases, the Court had before it an exceedingly poorly drafted
definition311 that failed to support fully either side's position on the mitigating
measures issue. The key language in the definition was ambiguous, 312 and
the seemingly concrete guidance from the statutory findings section was,
upon close scrutiny, vague at best.3"3 As Justice Breyer noted, it had a
choice of two evils: including within the ADA's coverage some people whom
Congress may not have intended to protect, or excluding some people whom
Congress surely intended to cover.314 Given the remedial purposes of the
statute, the legislative history, the policies at stake, and the moral imperative
to combat disability discrimination on a broad scale, the Court chose the
308. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150.
309. The Sutton plaintiffs and the Kirkingburg plaintiff suffered from impaired vision, see id.
at 2143; Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2165-66 (1999), and the plaintiff in
Murphy suffered from hypertension, see Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133,
2136 (1999).
310. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
311. For a detailed criticism of the disability definition, see Eichhorn, supra note 9.
312. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 279-81 and accompanying text.
314. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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greater evil, which now stands to perpetuate itself in future caselaw.
Whether impairment-based discrimination is perpetuated against a person in
wheelchair or a person who uses glasses, "the nature of the discrimination
alleged is of the same character and should be treated accordingly."315
Ideally, the ADA would protect all mentally and physically impaired
individuals from discrimination, whether or not their impairments cause
"substantial" limitations. However, given the lingering public belief in a
class of "truly" disabled people, Congress never had the political will to
expand coverage this widely and will probably not muster such will in the
near future. Even so, Congress's originally intended reach has been so
narrowed by the Sutton-Murphy-Kirkingburg trio that it is now incumbent
upon Congress to amend the ADA to reflect its originally intended scope.
Even if Congress must retain the "substantially limits" language, it should
clarify that a plaintiff's disabled status should be assessed without regard to
mitigating measures. At this point, only legislative effort will stop the courts
from continuing to deprive Americans of protection from disability
discrimination. Congress must not let this greater evil persist.
315. Id. at 2158 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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